U.S. Aircraft Carriers Have Become Obsolete Against Iran’s Hypersonic Missiles / Negotiations Are a Trap

According to Rokna, Scott Ritter, a former intelligence officer in the U.S. Marine Corps and a former United Nations weapons inspector, in an extensive interview with a YouTube channel, while emphasizing that Trump needs these negotiations more than Iran does, explains that the West has always sought to undermine Iran’s cultural and social foundations through its intelligence apparatuses and, by exploiting inadequately controlled information and communication channels, has infiltrated certain Iranian Western-oriented circles and recruited agents from among them. Any negotiation over Iran’s missile capability constitutes strategic suicide for Iran.

Referring to remarks by Rubio regarding limiting the range of Iran’s ballistic missiles, Scott Ritter explains that such a condition is, in practice, equivalent to “disarmament” and a demand for “strategic suicide” by the Islamic Republic, because, in his view, Iran’s survival rests precisely on this point: missile capability that can target Israel and make the cost of an attack unbearable for Tel Aviv.

Ritter argues that if Iran reduces the range of its missiles in a way that no longer allows it to strike Israel, Israel would attack and devastate Iran without fear of retaliation; therefore, such a condition is fundamentally “non-negotiable” and inherently “deadlock-inducing” from the outset.

He stresses that missiles are not Iran’s preferred offensive tool, but rather the backbone of deterrence and the guarantor of survival, and that any framework seeking to remove this pillar would effectively leave Iran defenseless against Israel’s military option.

War Could Turn Into a Disaster for Trump

From Scott Ritter’s perspective, the main reason the United States and Donald Trump personally avoid moving toward war with Iran is a combination of strategic incapacity and heavy domestic political considerations.

He states that the United States is incapable of delivering a “decisive blow” to Iran and that any military attack, instead of quickly ending the crisis, would push Iran toward responses that could destroy Israel while simultaneously imposing serious and uncontrollable costs on U.S. forces and interests. Within this framework, Ritter concludes that it is Washington that needs negotiations more than Tehran and that, contrary to the official narrative, Iran is not in a position of weakness or need for an agreement. In his view, this entire process is less the product of field or regional developments and more a direct reflection of crises in U.S. domestic politics—especially the proximity of the congressional midterm elections and the risk of losing the House of Representatives, which could pave the way for successive impeachments and effectively an early end to Trump’s presidency.

Accordingly, Ritter emphasizes that war with Iran in such an environment would not only bring no strategic achievement for the United States, but could turn into a domestic political disaster for Trump.

War Against Iran Serves Only Israel’s Interests

According to Scott Ritter, any potential U.S. military confrontation with Iran is inherently a “war of choice,” not a defensive war stemming from an immediate threat or direct attack against the United States, and its primary motivation is above all an effort to satisfy Israel and respond to Tel Aviv’s security demands.

He emphasizes that Iran has neither attacked the United States, nor created a direct threat against its territory or citizens, nor provided any objective justification for a preemptive military action; therefore, any attempt to drag the United States into war relies on exaggerated and politicized narratives that do not withstand careful scrutiny.

Iran Must Respond Immediately, Decisively, and Deterrently to Betrayal / Negotiation Is “a Trap”

Ritter offers noteworthy recommendations to Iran. He emphasizes a dual strategy and explains that Iran should enter negotiations not out of weakness or trust, but to block political pretexts in Washington and prevent the formation of domestic consensus in the United States in favor of military action; however, Ritter stresses that Iranian officials must always assume that negotiation is “a trap” intended to serve as cover for a surprise operation. For this reason, he recommends that Iran simultaneously maintain diplomatic channels while keeping its military forces and intelligence apparatus on full alert and always assume the worst-case scenario.

He then states explicitly: “Iran has no friends among U.S. officials and must seek new friends and completely detach its mindset from the West.”

Iran Should Significantly Increase the Cost of Any Potential Attack

Ritter points to the growing development of Iran’s relations with Russia and says, “Iran today, compared to the past, due to security, intelligence, and technological cooperation with Russia and, on a broader level, with China, is in a stronger deterrent position and can significantly increase the cost of any potential attack.”

From this perspective, Ritter emphasizes that negotiations for Iran should serve as a tool to manage the U.S. political environment and prevent the legitimization of war, while simultaneously relying on deterrent capabilities and strengthening strategic ties with the East, ensuring readiness so that when negotiations turn into a trap or betrayal, Iran’s response is swift, decisive, and deterrent—this being the only rational path to navigate this tense phase.

U.S. Aircraft Carriers Are Obsolete Against Iran’s Hypersonic Missiles

Scott Ritter views recent naval encounters not as a sign of U.S. superiority or aggression, but as a reflection of Washington’s strategic fear of Iran’s anti-access and area-denial capabilities. According to him, U.S. aircraft carriers have become “obsolete” systems in the face of a new generation of Iran’s precise, maneuverable, and hypersonic missiles; therefore, aggressive reactions such as targeting a drone stem more from fear of exposing a carrier’s position and placing it at risk than from a position of strength.

Ritter emphasizes that in a war with a modern adversary equipped with anti-access weapons, aircraft carriers can no longer approach coastlines, because the risk of sinking is real. In his view, America’s nervous behavior at sea shows that Iran’s deterrence has created a real equation that forces even the greatest symbol of U.S. naval power into caution, concealment, and defensive reactions.

A Warning About Western-Oriented Elements Inside Iran

At the end, Scott Ritter refers to a concept he calls “cognitive warfare”—a war that, in his view, is far more dangerous than direct military confrontation, because its aim is the collapse of a society from within, without firing a single shot.

Ritter explains that this type of war operates through a combination of cultural, psychological, informational, and social tools, and that its main prerequisite for success is “broad and uncontrolled connectivity” to data flows, communication networks, and the international elite space. According to him, Western intelligence services, including the CIA, MI6, and Mossad, exploit precisely these communication platforms to infiltrate, recruit, influence, and cognitively steer societies, gradually undermining cultural cohesion, social trust, and political legitimacy.

Ritter specifically points to the role of segments of academic elites and so-called “Western-oriented” layers in Iran, who are exposed to recruitment and influence through academic travel, international conferences, and professional networks, and who then, upon returning, reproduce these intellectual patterns in academic and social environments—a process that, according to him, manifests itself at critical moments such as protests and unrest in the form of student activism, radicalization of discourse, and even participation in violence.

Ritter emphasizes that within this framework, the “free flow of data” is not necessarily an advantage, but can turn into a security vulnerability, and warns that the ultimate goal of this cognitive war is to instill the notion that the West is Iran’s “friend” and that the only obstacle to prosperity and progress lies in internal structures—a notion he considers a dangerous illusion.

In contrast, Ritter stresses that unlike the West, Russia and China do not conduct such cognitive warfare against Iran, and for this reason, he describes continued mental and communicative dependence on the West as a kind of “battered victim syndrome”—one that has been repeatedly harmed yet continues to hope for the same source of damage. In his view, countering this cognitive war requires recognizing the enemy, intelligently managing connectivity, and understanding the reality that the primary threat is not necessarily military, but can be slow, gradual, and aimed at the intellectual and cultural foundations of society from within.