U.S. Issues Ultimatum to Lebanon: “Decide Hezbollah’s Fate”

Thomas Barrack, the U.S. special envoy, is conducting what has been described as a “last-chance mission” aimed at persuading Lebanon to accept direct negotiations with Israel. This initiative is part of Washington’s broader strategy to redefine the security order in the Levant and contain the Resistance. The United States has invoked a framework similar to the security arrangements previously imposed between Syria and Israel—an approach viewed as a partial relinquishment of Lebanon’s sovereignty. The threat of cutting financial aid by the U.S. and Arab states serves as the primary instrument of this diplomatic pressure. The goal is to secure a strategic victory for Israel through negotiations rather than war.

According to Rokna, Lebanon is facing an internal dilemma: how to implement a disarmament plan against a group that still holds overwhelming military power and a broad socio-political base, without triggering civil war—particularly while Israeli aggression continues and parts of southern Lebanon remain under Israeli occupation.

The “Shield of the Homeland” plan, approved in September 2025, seeks to monopolize all arms under the control of the Lebanese army by the end of the year, prioritizing disarmament in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah has denounced the plan as an “American-Israeli dictate,” warning that any unilateral implementation could ignite a civil war. The movement insists it will only engage in dialogue with the government and army within the framework of a “national defense strategy,” not disarmament.

Public opinion in Lebanon largely aligns with Hezbollah’s stance: around 70 percent of Lebanese citizens—including half of the Sunni population and more than one-third of Christians—oppose disarmament without a viable defensive alternative. Over 75 percent also believe the Lebanese army alone cannot repel Israeli aggression. President Joseph Aoun has deemed the disarmament plan “impossible” to execute. Therefore, the “Shield of the Homeland” initiative is widely viewed as an attempt to attract foreign financial support rather than a realistic disarmament effort.

Hezbollah’s Military Readiness and New Doctrine – Hezbollah maintains that following Israeli attacks and losses, it has rebuilt its capabilities and is now “100 percent ready” for confrontation. Its current doctrine focuses on “reconstruction in secrecy” and maintaining a “finger on the trigger” — avoiding full-scale war for now but responding decisively if Israel crosses red lines or launches a major invasion.

Reports indicate Hezbollah’s missile arsenal has expanded and its precision and guidance have significantly improved, enhancing its deterrence capacity. Notably, most of these weapons survived Israeli strikes, underscoring the failure of Israel’s preemptive operations to dismantle Hezbollah’s deterrence network.

Tactical Shifts: Drones and Missile Concealment – In response to recent damages, Hezbollah has adopted new tactics. According to some Israeli media reports, the group has begun large-scale production and deployment of small drones designed to saturate Israeli air defenses through “swarm” tactics, while also prioritizing the concealment of precision missiles — including hiding launchers in covert or underground locations to minimize detection and destruction.

This combination of quantitative (mass drone use) and qualitative (concealed precision missiles) measures forms the backbone of Hezbollah’s new survival and deterrence doctrine. Overall, the rapid rebuilding of capabilities, extensive arsenal, and tactical innovation—alongside a restructured command network—have transformed Hezbollah into an unpredictable and resilient deterrent force, complicating Israel’s military and intelligence calculations.

War Scenarios and Escalation Drivers – The imminent failure of U.S. diplomacy may push Lebanon toward another large-scale conflict. A realistic assessment requires identifying the key escalation triggers:

1. Expiration of Diplomatic Deadline: If Lebanese leaders reject direct negotiations on disarmament—a mission Barrack has labeled as the “last opportunity”—Washington is expected to signal to Israel that the diplomatic window has closed, rendering military action “legitimate.”

2. Israel’s Domestic Motivations (Netanyahu Factor): Credible diplomatic sources suggest that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s main motivation for a major assault stems from domestic political calculations. Observers believe Netanyahu might attempt to divert attention from corruption trials and potential imprisonment by opening a new military front.

3. Misjudgment in Military Operations: The continuation of Israel’s “low-intensity” strikes, which have recently intensified, risks crossing Hezbollah’s strategic “red lines,” potentially sparking a full-scale confrontation. In recent days, a group of Israeli soldiers reportedly crossed the border into the Lebanese town of Blida, advancing about one kilometer inside Lebanese territory. This prompted President Joseph Aoun to instruct the army to respond to Israeli violations after nearly 11 months of governmental silence.

Post-UNIFIL Security Architecture (2026–2027) – With the U.S. and Israel pressuring the UN Security Council to terminate the UNIFIL mission by the end of 2026, southern Lebanon’s security structure faces a critical turning point.

1. Security Vacuum After UNIFIL Withdrawal:
   Resolution 2790 extended UNIFIL’s mandate for the final time, mandating the withdrawal of around 10,500 peacekeepers by the end of 2027. This move—driven by Israeli dissatisfaction with UNIFIL’s “inability to contain Hezbollah”—eliminates the main de-escalation and emergency communication channel between Lebanon and Israel. Consequently, a major security vacuum will emerge before the Lebanese army achieves full readiness.

2. Israel’s Doctrine and Risk of Unilateral Action:
   In the absence of peacekeeping forces, Israel may seek to unilaterally establish a buffer zone or reoccupy parts of southern Lebanon. Tel Aviv’s new doctrine focuses on enforcing “red lines” through military might, followed by U.S.-brokered security arrangements designed to demilitarize border areas and legitimize preemptive strikes.

3. European Reaction and Efforts to Preserve Influence:
   European countries contributing to UNIFIL—particularly France, Italy, and Spain—fear a loss of strategic influence in the eastern Mediterranean. They are exploring alternative frameworks, such as bilateral defense agreements with Lebanon or the creation of a new EU-led peacekeeping mission to maintain their military and political presence.

In summary, the end of the UNIFIL mission under current conditions weakens the security balance in southern Lebanon and heightens the risk of unilateral Israeli incursions and renewed border clashes, while Lebanon still lacks the capacity to fill the impending security void.

Conclusion – The analysis indicates that Lebanon is under triple pressure:
First, a U.S. ultimatum demanding Hezbollah’s disarmament;
Second, the Lebanese government’s inability to implement it without igniting a civil war;
And third, Israel’s ongoing ceasefire violations and territorial incursions, which Hezbollah cites to justify its defensive readiness.

These factors significantly increase the risk of large-scale conflict in 2025–2026, likely triggered by the collapse of U.S.-led diplomacy and Israel’s internal political motivations. With the conclusion of its diplomatic mission, Washington is effectively paving the way for unilateral Israeli aggression under the pretext of reshaping the regional security order.

Nevertheless, Hezbollah’s enduring deterrent power on the ground and widespread domestic support for the Resistance continue to constrain this scenario and keep the cost of any Israeli aggression prohibitively high.