Times of Israel: A Golden Opportunity for Iranian Intelligence Infiltration / Tel Aviv Struggles to Contain Iranian Operations

According to Rokna, as Israel faces escalating security and military crises, Hebrew media have once again revealed the deep concern of the regime’s security agencies regarding “Iranian intelligence infiltration.”

A recent report on the Times of Israel website indicates that Tel Aviv admits it is unable to fully control Iran’s intelligence activities, and the phenomenon of “deep infiltration into Israeli society” has become a persistent challenge.

The report states that Iran, without relying on sophisticated tools but through social networks and simple communications, has successfully encouraged Israeli citizens and even active-duty soldiers to cooperate in intelligence efforts. Hebrew media describe this as evidence of the “fragility of Israel’s internal security structure.”

The author of the report acknowledges that Iran has exploited deep social divisions within the occupied territories—between Jews and Arabs, religious and secular communities, and right- and left-wing groups—to recruit individuals. According to the report, this indicates Iran’s “readiness for a new phase of confrontation.”

The report adds that Israeli security agencies are unable to fully identify these networks and spies, which has driven them to call for harsher punishments—an admission reflecting Tel Aviv’s structural confusion and weakness in countering Iranian intelligence activities.

According to the report, “Iranians primarily recruit spies remotely through social networks, messaging apps, and work-from-home websites… The Iranian intelligence network uses applications such as Telegram, WhatsApp, Facebook, Instagram, and high-paying job sites to recruit Israelis from all sectors of society, including Arabs, Jews, foreign workers, and new immigrants. Some Iranian intelligence referrals are facilitated by business figures, legal organizations, or journalists, and occasionally through Jewish communities or Israelis abroad.”

The report continues: “The main incentive is easy money, ranging from hundreds to thousands of dollars for missions such as photographing facilities, monitoring propaganda awareness, with payment increasing as risk levels rise.”

The Times of Israel notes that “network operators sometimes exploit individuals’ feelings of deprivation or political resentment to recruit them. Once a recruit is identified and completes intelligence tasks, evidence is collected against them for potential blackmail. If cooperation ceases, they are threatened with being reported to Shin Bet. Initially, tasks appear harmless, such as photographing parks, intersections, government buildings from outside, parking lots, or inspecting abandoned items and immediately sending selfies or videos for verification.”

The report claims: “After demonstrating discipline, the level of missions increases, including following individuals, photographing homes of security personnel or scientists, installing cameras or GPS devices on vehicles, and planting money or equipment in public areas. Even individuals with minimal intelligence should understand the nature of their actions, making claims of ‘I did not know what I was doing’ completely unfounded.”

It further explains: “In some cases, after a few missions, the handler assesses the individual’s readiness for sabotage and assassination, such as throwing Molotov cocktails, attempting harm to an Israeli nuclear scientist, or targeting ‘local soldiers’ for a contracted killing.”

The report concludes with a warning that Iran is developing its missile capabilities and preparing for the “next phase of the battle,” a warning that, rather than revealing new facts, reflects Tel Aviv’s fear of Iran’s growing power and that of its allies.