Ali Akbar Salehi: Zarif’s Nuclear Consortium Proposal Dates Back to Pre-Revolution Era

Read Part of the Interview with Ali Akbar Salehi, Former Foreign Minister of Iran

Q: When does the idea of a nuclear cooperation consortium date back to?
A: The idea of a consortium predates the Revolution. It emerged when Dr. Akbar Etemad began significant initiatives to establish nuclear reactors in Iran. He planned to sign a contract with Westinghouse for building a nuclear power plant and for fuel supply services. However, the U.S. declined to collaborate on this.

Due to the American refusal to engage in nuclear cooperation and fuel cycle development with Iran, Dr. Etemad turned to European companies and signed agreements with Germany’s Kraftwerk Union and France’s Framatome. Despite these contracts, he continued negotiations with the Americans, focusing on obtaining the full nuclear fuel cycle and establishing nuclear fuel fabrication facilities in Iran.

The U.S. created numerous obstacles, but Dr. Etemad’s persistence led to the emergence of the nuclear fuel production consortium concept. The U.S. proposal was to establish a consortium outside Iranian territory, with Iran participating merely as a member. Dr. Etemad rejected this, arguing that such a plan could not offer Iran adequate assurance, emphasizing that the fuel fabrication facilities must be under Iranian national sovereignty.

Q: Was Iran seeking the entire nuclear fuel cycle during this period, or was the dispute with the U.S. only about reprocessing spent fuel?
A: The negotiations primarily concerned the full nuclear fuel cycle. The main point of contention was the initial stages of the fuel cycle, including exploration, extraction, conversion, enrichment, and fuel rod fabrication. The Americans did not consent and erected many barriers. Dr. Etemad tried various approaches to overcome this, but the project was ultimately suspended following the Islamic Revolution.

Q: Was the consortium issue ever raised again later on?
A: Yes, in the early 2000s, when Iran’s nuclear dossier became contentious again, several proposals emerged to resolve the fabricated crisis. As the issue became more international and severe, various proposals were discussed, including different forms of nuclear consortiums.

During that period, in response to Iran’s concerns about the sustainability of fuel supply for its power plants—and Iran’s reasoning that domestic fuel production stemmed from distrust of foreign partners—the idea of establishing an international nuclear fuel bank was proposed. The mechanism involved countries becoming members of the bank and receiving guaranteed fuel supplies for their reactors.

Establishment of the Fuel Bank in Kazakhstan

It was agreed that a fuel bank would be established in Kazakhstan to alleviate concerns that international fuel suppliers might, through sanctions or pretexts, block access to nuclear fuel. Despite its seemingly compelling logic, this proposal did not gain widespread support. Countries like Iran believed that even if the bank operated under IAEA and UN supervision, powerful nations could still block access to fuel shares whenever they wished. These concerns were later validated.

In international relations, it is power that dictates outcomes, not frameworks like the nuclear fuel bank. We see this vividly today in the crimes occurring in Gaza, where all international laws, rights, treaties, and protocols are being violated. Yet, global powers have effortlessly blocked all efforts to stop these atrocities, allowing blatant violations to persist.

Thus, Iran and several other nations, which believed in having sovereign control over their nuclear fuel production, did not support this plan. Nevertheless, some other countries welcomed it, and Kazakhstan was ultimately selected as the host. During the tenure of the late Yukiya Amano, then Director General of the IAEA, the Kazakh fuel bank was inaugurated. However, the bank only provided natural uranium.

Q: You mentioned Iran opposed the fuel bank’s establishment. What alternative did Iran propose?
A: Around the time uranium enrichment became a major topic, Iran proposed forming an international nuclear fuel production consortium. Given Kazakhstan's vast uranium reserves, Iran suggested receiving natural uranium from Kazakhstan, enriching it on Iranian soil, and returning it to Kazakhstan for distribution to other countries needing nuclear fuel.

The idea was for natural uranium to be sent to Iran, enriched there, then returned to Kazakhstan, allowing the Kazakh fuel bank to supply enriched fuel rather than natural uranium. Another step—converting enriched uranium into fuel rods or assemblies—could be added to this process.

Iran further expanded the proposal by encouraging foreign countries and companies to invest in its enrichment industry. One goal was to alleviate concerns about any possible diversion to non-peaceful purposes, as the presence of foreign managers, experts, and inspectors in Iran’s enrichment facilities would ensure transparency.

These ideas have long been discussed, but none have been implemented.

Q: What became of the Kazakh fuel bank?
A: As mentioned, the bank was inaugurated by Yukiya Amano, but it is now largely dormant and archived. There’s little current activity from this institution. In fact, Iran was supposed to be one of its first customers.

During President Hassan Rouhani’s tenure, under the JCPOA, Iran and Kazakhstan had agreed to a deal in which Iran would receive 2,000 tons of natural uranium from the Kazakh fuel bank. However, in 2018, when U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew from the JCPOA, the transaction was blocked. Despite the signed agreement and completion of legal procedures, Kazakhstan refused to deliver the uranium to Iran.

This outcome affirmed Iran’s initial concerns about the reliability of the fuel bank. Global powers can indeed block access to such institutions or consortiums not under their direct control. The agreed process—natural uranium to Iran, enriched uranium returned—was never realized. Geopolitical factors and interference from major powers left the initiative incomplete.

Q: In 2010, you proposed a consortium with Russia involving enrichment both in Iran and Russia. Is that correct?
A: That was a long time ago, but I recall an understanding with Russia to establish fuel fabrication complexes in Iran. They had promised to create a company (consortium) over three years, under Russian certification, to use enriched uranium from Iran in fuel assemblies for the Bushehr reactor. If realized, this collaboration could have enabled Iran to supply fuel for Russian-built reactors in other countries via the Kazakh fuel bank. Iran would have become a key link in the global nuclear fuel supply chain.

Q: Recently, Dr. Mohammad Javad Zarif and former Deputy Foreign Minister Mohsen Baharvand published a joint article proposing the creation of a “Middle Eastern Network for Atomic Research and Advancement” (abbreviated as MENARE). How do you see this initiative differing from past consortium proposals?
A: According to Mr. Baharvand, the article is more of a press note and summary of the proposal’s themes; its full details have yet to be published. But essentially, this proposal is another iteration of the consortium idea in a new form. A key feature appears to be inclusive participation in research and development and joint nuclear fuel production, whereby each member country would take on a specific part of the fuel production process.

This concept is effectively a rebranded version of the consortium idea, emphasizing regional cooperation and collective participation among Middle Eastern countries—excluding any state seeking or possessing nuclear weapons. It aims to ensure non-proliferation of nuclear arms among members.

Various proposals have emerged around this idea. For instance, one country could supply natural uranium, another could convert it to uranium hexafluoride gas, a third could enrich it, and a fourth could fabricate fuel rods. These are diverse proposals being discussed. However, as I noted, the full content of Dr. Zarif and Mr. Baharvand’s proposal has not yet been released, so I cannot comment further on its specifics.