Israel’s Strategic Weakness Against Iran Exposed Amid Regional Tensions

In recent days, and even under the current circumstances, many experts and media outlets have warned of a potential new war between Iran and Israel. Some field movements have also been reported in this regard. For example, reports indicate that Israeli fighter jets recently violated Iraqi airspace and approached Iran’s borders. Meanwhile, there have been reports of the presence of U.S. airborne forces in the Kurdistan region of Iraq.

According to Rokna, Iran has, in turn, conducted several missile, drone, and ground exercises and increased the readiness level of its navy, while integrating new warships into its fleet. Amid this, Western and Hebrew media outlets have regularly engaged in propaganda, issuing threats against Iran and attempting to portray a war with Iran as imminent. Senior Israeli officials, through their own statements, have further amplified this media wave.

Although some believe these campaigns are currently focused not on instigating a new war against Iran but rather on keeping economic and social pressures on the country in a state of limbo, the essence is clear. In other words, the United States and Israel aim to maintain a heightened security atmosphere around Iran, thereby inducing serious economic consequences and potentially provoking domestic protests and actions against the Iranian state.

Nevertheless, beyond all the threats Israel has voiced against Iran, it is important to recognize that the regime faces three serious weaknesses regarding any new adventurism against Iran, weaknesses it has yet to overcome and is unlikely to resolve in the near term.

First, the developments of the past two years in West Asia, particularly the Gaza and Lebanon conflicts, have shown that while Israel is adept at initiating crises and new wars, it struggles to manage and achieve desired outcomes. In reality, the regime cannot realize its objectives precisely, which subjects it to widespread pressure. For example, in the Gaza conflict, after two years of intense fighting, bombing the entire Gaza Strip, and global condemnation, Israel was ultimately forced to negotiate with Hamas and reach a ceasefire.

This occurred despite the original aim of the Gaza assault being the complete destruction of Hamas. Israeli intelligence assessments indicate that Hamas still has 20,000 paramilitary forces and remains the main hope for Gazans regarding security in the post-ceasefire period. The situation in Lebanon is similar.

Most intelligence assessments by agencies such as Shabak and Mossad suggest that the destruction or disarmament of Hezbollah is more of a fantasy, and residents of northern Israel, despite over a year of ceasefire in the northern front, still fear renewed clashes with Hezbollah. This factor makes any new Israeli adventurism against Hezbollah a significant risk. In other West Asian theaters like Syria and Yemen, Israel’s actions have increased uncertainty rather than enhancing its security.

If Israel is unable to achieve its objectives in regional projects within limited frameworks, how can it confront a 90-million-strong country like Iran, with extensive capacities across military, economic, and social domains, and expect to achieve its intended results? This uncertainty over the consequences of a new adventurism against Iran makes Israel cautious toward Tehran, which in turn signals Iran’s strength.

Second, despite its strong intelligence capabilities and reliance on Western and regional partners, Israel struggles to meaningfully interpret and comprehend the multi-layered data on Iran’s military and social power. Israel’s expectation that, during a 12-day imposed conflict, the Iranian people would rise against their political system and pave the way for Zionist objectives demonstrates its detachment from the realities of Iranian society and power.

This issue was so serious that even Netanyahu, upon witnessing the massive public support for their country, suddenly shifted his stance, stating that overthrowing Iran’s political system was not a top priority for Israel—despite initially presenting it as a primary objective during the first day of hostilities.

Finally, Israel’s international position does not provide the space for major adventurism. Even its Arab partners understand that striking Iran could trigger severe scenarios for them in the coming years. Likewise, countries such as Pakistan know that Israel prioritizes its own confrontations in the region. Moreover, Israel has committed extensive crimes in West Asia over recent months, and any new criminal adventurism against a country like Iran could provoke serious retaliatory scenarios.

Israeli senior military and intelligence officials have described Iran’s audacity during the 12-day war, targeting the heart of Israel with a barrage of missiles, as the greatest surprise. Some analysts believe that Iran’s main strategy in case of a new Israeli adventurism would be a “kill the jackal” approach, leaving no margin for error. Israeli society is at a breaking point and cannot tolerate a full-scale, deadly war.