Has the Trend of “Iranophobia” Shifted Toward “Israelophobia”?

Trita Parsi, senior analyst on Iranian affairs at the Quincy Institute

According to Rokna, quoting Responsible Statecraft, in a remarkable transformation within the political order of the Persian Gulf, it is no longer Iran that is being portrayed as the central driver of instability in the Middle East. The finger of blame is now pointed directly at Israel. This shift in narrative became public through statements by Badr al-Busaidi, Oman’s foreign minister, at the “Manama Dialogue” held in Bahrain. Speaking at the event organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, he stated, “We have long known that Israel is the primary source of insecurity in the region.”

Israel at the Center of Crisis: An Unprecedented Shift in Arab Security Calculations

These remarks are not merely a temporary position or symbolic expression. For roughly four decades, U.S. diplomacy and security strategy have rested on the assumption that Iran is the epicenter of Middle Eastern instability. Now that Gulf Arab powers are challenging this premise, Washington faces a fundamental warning. If regional governments no longer see Iran as the source of unrest, the U.S. insistence on the old narrative of a “permanent Iranian threat” risks distancing its policies from the new realities—even as many officials from the Trump administration still cling to those outdated frameworks.

Since the 1980s, U.S. foreign policy has portrayed Iran as the principal destabilizing force. During the Clinton administration, then–Secretary of State Warren Christopher famously declared, “Wherever you look in the region, you see the hand of Iran,” a statement that reinforced bipartisan consensus in Washington and underpinned the “dual containment” policy—one that viewed Iraq and Iran as twin threats while portraying Israel as the “anchor of stability.” The underlying logic was that constraining Tehran and Baghdad while strengthening Israel would bring peace and order.

Although the names and tactics of this framework evolved over time, its essence remained virtually untouched. Even the Trump administration’s “Abraham Accords” ultimately returned to the same foundational premise: that Iran is the chief threat and Arab states must align with Israel to contain it. Only briefly, during the aftermath of the JCPOA under President Obama, did Washington momentarily deviate from that formula.

Within this context, an Arab foreign minister openly rejecting—and even reversing—this long-standing narrative marks a profound shift in regional calculations. What has accelerated this change is Israel’s recent behavior. In the past two years alone, Israel has attacked seven countries, while simultaneously continuing what a United Nations commission has described as “genocide” in Gaza. The devastation in Gaza, destruction in parts of southern Lebanon, and Israeli strikes on Qatar have made it impossible for Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states to ignore the regional repercussions of Israel’s actions.

In other words, Israel is now viewed by many Arab capitals as the principal source of instability and threat to regional security, replacing Iran in that role. If Washington fails to recognize this shift, it risks a dangerous strategic rift with its Gulf allies.

Oman and the End of the “Iran as Source of Instability” Narrative in the Middle East

Omani officials believe that the United States’ own policies have paved the way for the current situation. According to them, Washington’s strategy of isolating and containing Iran not only failed to reduce tensions but deepened regional divides and destroyed opportunities for dialogue and reconciliation. From Muscat’s perspective, if Iran had been integrated into the economic and political structure of the Middle East, it would have been possible to ease tensions not only with the U.S. and Israel but also between Tehran and its Gulf neighbors.

On this basis, Badr al-Busaidi, in his Manama address, called for the establishment of a comprehensive regional security architecture—one that invites Iran, Iraq, and Yemen into dialogue rather than excluding them. His assertion that “we have long known” Israel to be the main source of instability indicates that this is not a new perception, but rather a long-held view that Arab officials are now willing to voice publicly, even before a largely American audience.

The significance of this stance lies in the identity of the speaker: a foreign minister from a GCC country—and from Oman in particular, a nation renowned for its mediating role between Iran and the United States. The rejection of the traditional regional security framework by such a credible diplomatic actor carries profound strategic implications for both Washington and Arab capitals.

This does not mean that challenges arising from Iran’s policies are being ignored. Existing research, including a 2020 study co-authored by the writer and Matthew Petti, shows that Iran has been among the most interventionist actors in the region for decades—although since 2015, Turkey and the UAE have surpassed it in that regard. The key point, however, is this: if GCC members no longer regard Iran as the main threat, their willingness to align with Washington’s Iran-focused strategies will inevitably decline.

The Trump administration, pursuing a “maximum pressure” campaign, may now find that it lacks reliable backing in the Gulf—unless it undertakes a genuine policy revision. Otherwise, U.S. strategy risks drifting dangerously away from the region’s evolving realities.

Heeding al-Busaidi’s proposal for an inclusive regional security framework could not only help stabilize the Middle East but also give the United States an opportunity to gradually shift the responsibility for regional security back to local powers. This path could ultimately facilitate a responsible reduction of America’s military footprint and, eventually, the return of U.S. forces home—a goal that several American presidents have announced but never achieved.

After four decades in which Iran was consistently blamed as the root of instability, the Middle East is now identifying a new center of concern. This moment presents Washington with a critical opportunity to abandon its “Iran-centric” mindset and acknowledge that the region has changed—and that U.S. policy must change with it.