What Interests Is the United States Pursuing in the Middle East?

M Mahmoud Sultan, Senior Middle East Analyst at Al Jazeera Net

According to Rokna, reporting from Al Jazeera Net, the Trump administration’s national security strategy explicitly emphasized that the United States seeks a Middle East that neither becomes a safe haven and breeding ground for extremism, nor falls under the dominance of any power hostile to America, while at the same time contributing to the stability of the global energy market. These priorities have been defined along the same trajectory as previous U.S. administrations, where terrorism, ensuring the security and prosperity of Israel, and the issue of oil continue to constitute the three central axes of Washington’s focus on the Middle East.

From “America First” to Defending Distant Allies; The Contradiction at the Heart of Washington’s Middle East Policy

Within the framework of these interests, the United States spends tens of billions of dollars annually to “manage” the political and security dynamics of the Middle East. This longstanding line of American foreign policy has repeatedly faced waves of domestic criticism, especially from conservative currents that stress the need to focus financial resources on internal crises and problems, arguing that unconditional support for certain regional allies contradicts the “America First” slogan. One of the most precise existing estimates indicates that if the United States were to abandon its Middle Eastern mission, it could save between 65 to 70 billion dollars annually—a sum that would be returned directly to the U.S. Treasury.

According to estimates by Justin Logan, a researcher at the American think tank Defence Priorities, U.S. policies in the Middle East are both costly and, to some extent, surprising, given that the region, from a theoretical and strategic perspective, occupies a distant periphery of Washington’s direct interests. The Middle East accounts for only about 3.3 percent of global GDP, whereas this share is 32.5 percent in the Western Hemisphere and 25 percent in each of Europe and East Asia.

The Middle East’s population also includes only about 3.5 to 5 percent of the world’s population, and even if one assumes that a power could fully dominate or occupy the region, it would still struggle to pose a serious and direct military threat to the United States.

Logan argues that the prevailing belief in Washington—that the Middle East holds extraordinary importance for U.S. national security—is built on “ambiguous theories” regarding the energy economy, regional power balances, and the threat of terrorism. In his view, this perception relies not so much on concrete economic and strategic realities as on security pessimism and deeply ingrained policymaking habits.

Endless Wars and the Illusion of a Crusading Mission; Public Pressure for Disengagement from the Middle East

After Donald Trump presented a ceasefire proposal for Gaza in late September 2025, these questions returned to the center of attention. Will Walldorf, a professor at Wake Forest University, wrote on the Defense One website that Washington “overvalues the Middle East,” stressing that instead of deepening its intervention in regional affairs, the time has come for the United States to step back, redefine its presence in the region, and significantly limit its involvement.

He believes that the two principal strategic drivers of deep U.S. engagement in the Middle East over the past five decades—oil and terrorism—are no longer first-order strategic challenges. The United States is now a net exporter of oil and therefore has largely shed its previous dependence on Middle Eastern fossil fuels. Moreover, with the defeat of ISIS in 2019 and the sweeping weakening of al-Qaeda, local actors are increasingly capable of confronting and managing terrorist threats on their own.

At the same time, a significant number of analysts in the United States emphasize that America’s costly and fruitless wars in the “Greater Middle East” have brought neither peace nor lasting stability. Based on these bitter experiences, American public opinion has reached a breaking point against what many call “endless wars.” As a result, political leaders from both parties are now more willing to heed calls—voiced for decades—for withdrawal and disengagement from the region.

Martin Indyk, the late American diplomat (who passed away on 25 July 2024) and former U.S. Ambassador to Israel, believed that the objectives the United States defined for itself during the Cold War no longer align with present realities. He argued that after the sacrifice of many American lives and the squandering of vital resources, it is necessary for the United States to find a way to escape the cycle of costly and disheartening “crusading wars.”

Pivot to Asia and the Shadow Over the Middle East; Redefining Washington’s Regional Influence

The 7 October 2023 attack and the brutal subsequent assault on Gaza exposed the true limits of U.S. influence and the growing assertiveness of regional powers. Just when Washington was adjusting the level of its presence in the Middle East, a complex network of local alliances and rivalries was redrawing the region’s political map. In this context, former U.S. President Joe Biden never concealed his desire to extract the United States from the Middle East. Antony Blinken, the Secretary of State, said candidly in a pre-appointment interview that he expected Biden’s presidency to lead to a reduction in America’s level of intervention in the region.

Over the past several decades, nearly every U.S. administration has spoken of ambitious plans to redesign foreign policy around a “pivot to Asia”—a shift based on the premise that Washington could gradually withdraw from the Middle East and lighten the burden of military and political commitments in this turbulent geography.

With each new administration in Washington, Middle Eastern governments and the analysts close to them in the American capital have interpreted almost every U.S. move in the region as a sign of an “imminent withdrawal”—a perception typically accompanied by a wave of angry criticism, anxiety, and even emotional reactions. Every U.S. step is quickly labeled “abandoning friends,” a characterization that, according to Sarah Leah Whitson, helps justify the expansion of Middle Eastern relations with China or Russia—ties that are presented as a kind of natural protective umbrella and a conservative defensive reaction.

At the same time, debate continues over the consequences of reduced U.S. intervention in the Middle East. Optimists believe that in the absence of constant great-power interference, local forces will be better positioned to arrive at sustainable, indigenous solutions to regional conflicts. Pessimists, however, warn of a power vacuum and intensifying rivalry and confrontation among regional players, fearing that the absence of an external guarantor may unleash a new wave of turbulence and instability rather than produce order.

What is most evident is that the Middle East is entering a new phase—one in which traditional patterns of influence, power equations, and old alliances have been fundamentally reassessed, and none of the actors—either in Washington or in regional capitals—possess a clear picture of the final map of this reordering.

The Middle East’s Stifling Chamber and the Dream of America’s Hegemonic Sunlight

For decades, scholars who identify as “realists” have justified and repeatedly defended the militarization of the Middle East by the United States. They have consistently denied that this approach is rooted in greed, Christian ideological motives, or even imperialist assumptions, dismissing such “claimed motives” as something close to “superstition.” At the same time, Washington’s policy toward the region has always been shaped under pressure from two opposing forces: on the one hand, the necessity of safeguarding America’s enduring strategic interests, and on the other, an increasing desire to avoid becoming trapped in the quagmire of the Middle East’s endless problems.

Paul Wolfowitz, one of the principal architects of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, once said that shifting his focus from the Middle East to work on East Asia felt like “leaving a stuffy, cramped room for sunlight and fresh air.” According to Hal Brands, American officials have lived with this mental image for years: an eagerness to step into the light, while knowing they can never fully escape the darkness of the Middle East.

Some analysts believe that the “narrative of withdrawal” from the Middle East is itself deliberately crafted as a political and promotional tool—not merely to announce retreat, but primarily as a means of testing the intentions of international powers that aspire to displace the United States in its traditional spheres of influence. Within this framework, the narrative offers Washington a strategic opportunity to observe, measure, and evaluate the behavior of emerging powers such as China under the impression of America’s “apparent absence.”

At the same time, given that China’s leadership remains hesitant to leave its “comfort zone,” American decision-makers are increasingly eager to discern Beijing’s real intentions and capabilities—particularly if China is to step into the turbulent and high-risk waters of the Middle East and assume a more active role in this perilous geography.

In this context, Steven Simon, author of The Grand Delusion, recounts part of his explanation for the roots of U.S. losses in the Middle East over the past four decades. Simon identifies the decisive factor in Washington’s failures as the United States’ inability to correctly understand the realities of the region. He emphasizes that if America seeks any chance of sustainable success in the Middle East, it must abandon the imposition of its unilateral policies and instead prioritize listening to its local allies.

Given the concentration of geostrategic and cultural significance within the Middle East, it is no exaggeration to say that long-term global hegemony and secure command of the international order will be unattainable for any power unless it can exert effective and lasting dominance over this region in the long run.