Mohammed bin Salman surprises the region with the F-35; Saudi Arabia and the story of one trillion dollars

In the autumn of 2025, the White House once again became the center of turbulent Middle Eastern diplomacy when Donald Trump hosted Mohammed bin Salman. For this reason, analysts claim that this meeting and its resulting agreements constitute a historic turning point. Critics, including The Guardian, have described the deals as “unprecedented,” blending security and economics, while supporters view them as an opportunity for regional stability.

According to Rokna, with a pledge to invest 600 billion dollars in the United States—later raised to one trillion dollars—the Saudi crown prince not only strengthened economic ties but also facilitated interactions between the two countries’ business elites. These initiatives, spanning fields from technology to energy, could transform the strategic landscape of West Asia. But the question remains: will these exchanges shift the balance of power in favor of Tel Aviv and Riyadh?

From a security standpoint, the agreement to sell advanced F-35 fighter jets to Saudi Arabia represents a warning sign for Israel’s long-standing regional hegemony. Israel has long regarded itself as the only superior military power in the region. Experts warn that the sale of F-35s could push West Asia toward an arms race, although some argue that enhancing deterrence against shared threats may ultimately serve stability.

In this context, Rokna, conducted an in-depth interview with Gholamreza Karimi, Associate Professor of International Relations at Kharazmi University, examining the dimensions of Mohammed bin Salman’s trip to the United States and the resulting economic and security interactions between the two players. The full interview follows.

As the first question, how do you assess bin Salman’s visit to the White House, particularly given that this is his first trip after the Khashoggi killing? Especially since some analysts, citing the prevailing calm in Gaza and Trump’s May visit to the kingdom, have described this meeting as historic.

The meeting between Donald Trump and Mohammed bin Salman cannot be viewed as an ordinary diplomatic encounter. In fact, the most significant analytical aspect of this event is the political rehabilitation of Mohammed bin Salman. After seven years of strained relations between Washington and Riyadh—largely due to the shadow cast by the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi—Trump staged a grand and enthusiastic reception for the crown prince. In doing so, despite US intelligence reports confirming bin Salman’s direct role in the Khashoggi case, Trump sent a clear and explicit message: in his system, strategic and economic interests take absolute precedence over human rights considerations.

In Trump’s “America First” doctrine, economic and geopolitical interests have always outweighed human rights values. This meeting effectively ended bin Salman’s international isolation and granted him renewed legitimacy.

On the regional level, the most consequential aspect of the event pertains to Iran. During the meeting, the United States and Saudi Arabia formulated a joint strategy to contain Iran through a combination of smart pressure and open diplomatic channels. Trump declared that the United States was prepared to negotiate with Iran, even claiming that talks had already begun and that Iran was eager for an agreement. The ultimate goal is to push Iran toward a long-term deal that would weaken its revolutionary identity and regional influence. From Saudi Arabia’s perspective, the priority is to achieve the permanent suspension of Iran’s power, preferably keeping Tehran in a state of ambiguity—neither war nor peace. The United States, as a global power, seeks to maintain Iran as a middle-ranking regional state and therefore offers tactical concessions such as reduced sanctions.

The situation in Gaza is another crucial element reshaping regional dynamics. The Gaza war has altered calculations surrounding normalization efforts.

The economic-technological dimension of the visit was also significant. Saudi Arabia leveraged its relationship with China as a bargaining tool, using it to extract major concessions from Washington. The United States’ agreement to transfer sensitive technologies, including advanced AI chips, illustrates Trump’s willingness to accept major risks to prevent deeper Saudi-Chinese ties.

In sum, although a seemingly powerful alliance is taking shape between Saudi Arabia and the United States, deep structural fault lines remain that threaten the stability of this arrangement.

As you noted, the trip is significant in both economic and security dimensions, particularly as the crown prince announced a 600-billion-dollar investment in the United States, a figure that could rise to more than one trillion dollars. How do you assess this unprecedented deal?

Evaluating this unprecedented deal requires a comprehensive view of its intertwined economic and security dimensions. These agreements, which include massive investment commitments and the transfer of advanced military technologies, not only reshape bilateral relations but also fundamentally alter the geopolitical dynamics of the Middle East.

Economically, what occurred goes far beyond the traditional “oil for security” model that once defined US-Saudi relations. By committing to investments worth 600 billion dollars—later raised to over one trillion—Saudi Arabia is transforming its role from a mere oil client into a strategic partner and key investor in the American economy. Much of this investment will be channeled through joint funds with financial giants such as Blackstone, giving Saudi Arabia internal influence within the US economic system.

This move sends a strategic signal: although alternative partners exist, Riyadh’s preferred choice remains the United States. In return, Saudi Arabia expects reciprocal concessions in security and technology, including access to AI technologies and critical minerals.

In the security realm, the visit resulted in a potentially major deal granting Saudi Arabia access to F-35 fighter jets and advanced missile defense systems. For decades, US foreign policy in the region adhered to the principle of Israel’s absolute qualitative military edge. Approving this sale rewrites the security doctrine of the Middle East and elevates Saudi Arabia to a semi-independent security pole alongside Israel.

These exchanges shift the strategic balance and fuel a regional arms competition. Saudi Arabia’s acquisition of F-35s creates asymmetric deterrence against Iran’s missile capability and may trigger a domino effect among other regional powers—including Egypt, Turkey, and the UAE.

This development also challenges Israel’s traditional hegemony. Israel’s longstanding monopoly on access to America’s most advanced weapons has been breached, testing the stability of US-Israeli strategic ties.

Given recent news concerning the sale of F-35s to Saudi Arabia, how do you evaluate Israel’s short- and medium-term response?

Israel’s shift in posture regarding the sale of F-35s to Saudi Arabia is influenced by multiple factors. The first is the set of firm security guarantees the United States provided to preserve Israel’s military superiority. These assurances include delivering downgraded F-35 variants to Saudi Arabia lacking key radar, electronic warfare, and proprietary software features, while upgrading Israel’s own capabilities, potentially with sixth-generation fighters.

Equally important are US oversight mechanisms governing maintenance, deployment, and operational use of Saudi Arabia’s F-35 fleet. Such guarantees reassured Israel that its military edge would remain intact.

The second factor is changing regional threat assessments. The previously acute threat posed by Iran has diminished following recent developments, including the 12-day war. Strengthening Saudi Arabia’s air power might, from Israel’s perspective, increase pressure on Iran and its allies, easing Israel’s security burden.

The third factor relates to the Abraham Accords. Backchannel communication and trust-building efforts enabled Israeli and Saudi security officials to directly articulate and resolve concerns. Riyadh’s implicit willingness to join the accords encouraged Israel to remain silent on the F-35 deal.

The fourth factor is political pragmatism. Israel realized that the US had made an irreversible decision backed by Congress, and that Trump was determined to finalize the agreements with Saudi Arabia.

With these shifts in regional security dynamics, what scenarios do you foresee?

Mohammed bin Salman’s trip signals a major strategic transition in West Asia: a move from ideology-driven politics toward a realism rooted in economics and security. In this new order, national interests decisively outweigh collective ideals. Economics has become a hybrid instrument of both soft and hard power. Massive Saudi investments in the United States and Riyadh’s pursuit of advanced technologies such as F-35s reflect a redefinition of security: reduced dependence on oil, diversification of power sources, and transforming Saudi Arabia into an independent geopolitical center capable of guiding a controlled and stable peace aligned with Vision 2030.

Both Washington and Riyadh now accept that the region’s future order will not be unipolar. They acknowledge an emerging intra-regional multipolarity in which China serves as an active economic partner, and both seek structured dialogue with Iran to move Tehran away from its role as a disruptive force. Within this new framework, Saudi Arabia is positioned as a central mediator.

However, these developments extend beyond state-led diplomacy. Among Arab societies, elites and the middle class expect such large-scale deals to yield tangible gains for the Palestinian cause. A growing gap is emerging between policymakers operating under realist logic and publics for whom Palestine remains a core identity-based issue.

Previously, during Saudi-US talks, Riyadh demanded a civilian nuclear program in exchange for normalization with Israel. It is said that the crown prince raised this demand again. Given congressional opposition, how might the White House respond?

Securing a civilian nuclear program is one of the most sensitive aspects of US-Saudi strategic relations. Washington’s preferred model mirrors the Emirati “1+1” framework: purchasing reactors from a credible supplier such as the US or South Korea in exchange for Saudi Arabia’s binding commitment to fully renounce uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing. This issue is directly tied to Israel normalization and is used by Washington as leverage to achieve its regional priorities.

Congress remains a major obstacle. Many lawmakers, including some Republicans, are deeply skeptical about transferring sensitive nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia, citing concerns over Riyadh’s long-term intentions, potential competition with Israel’s undeclared nuclear arsenal, and the risk of technological leakage to countries like Pakistan or China.

Despite these challenges, Saudi Arabia could still secure a civilian nuclear program under strictly controlled conditions, provided it signs comprehensive safeguards with the IAEA, accepts the Additional Protocol, and allows extensive unannounced inspections.

In the region, this development could trigger costly and destabilizing nuclear competition among Turkey, Egypt, and others, while indirectly influencing Iran’s ongoing enrichment program. It also contradicts Saudi Arabia’s long-standing support for a nuclear-weapons-free Middle East and may undermine Riyadh’s diplomatic credibility.

If Saudi Arabia accepts the “zero enrichment” requirement, could West Asia still face nuclear competition?

Even with a “zero enrichment” commitment, nuclear competition in West Asia is unlikely to diminish. Israel possesses an undeclared nuclear arsenal, and Iran has achieved a high level of enrichment capability that it will not relinquish. As a result, a multi-layered, long-term nuclear competition among regional powers will inevitably intensify.

Even without enrichment or reprocessing, a large-scale civilian nuclear program creates deep dual-use infrastructure for Saudi Arabia: thousands of trained engineers, advanced research centers, operational expertise, and experience managing sensitive technologies. This latent capability could quickly evolve into an independent enrichment program if geopolitical conditions shift.

This potential will alarm regional competitors such as Turkey, Egypt, and the UAE, prompting them to expand their own capacities. Iran, having established its enrichment program, will not retreat. Thus, a real three-way nuclear competition among Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey is likely.

These shifts blur the line between civilian and military nuclear programs. States with large civilian programs reduce their breakout time, complicating Israel’s security calculations. Deterrence in the region will be redefined not merely by missile or air power, but by technological depth, scientific capability, and advanced AI and nuclear technology.