Netanyahu’s New Strategy to Test Trump’s Patience

David E. Rosenberg, an economic editor, columnist for Haaretz, and author of The Economics of Technology in Israel.

According to Rokna, citing Foreign Policy, in March 2025, Israel broke the ceasefire with Hamas, reigniting the flames of war in Gaza. In June of the same year, with direct U.S. support, Israel attacked Iran and bombed the nuclear facilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Finally, in September, Israeli warplanes targeted a compound in Qatar known as a headquarters for Hamas leaders.

From Full Autonomy to Full Restraint: An Unprecedented Shift in Controlling Israeli Military Behavior

The actor who could restrain Israel was Donald Trump, the President of the United States, and he played precisely this role. However, instead of simply putting pressure on Benjamin Netanyahu or holding him accountable for his adventures, Trump engineered a set of diplomatic arrangements and military deployments that effectively narrowed the operational margin of the Israeli army.

This shift in balance is most evident in the Gaza Strip. When Trump forced Netanyahu to accept a ceasefire last January, it took only a few weeks for the agreement to collapse and for Israel to resume its attacks. This time, however, Trump learned from experience. His new ceasefire and 20-point peace plan not only outline Gaza’s future framework but also increase the depth of external supervision over Israel’s behavior through the physical presence of the United States and several other countries in the implementation process.

The “Civil-Military Coordination Center” established near Gaza is tasked with closely monitoring the implementation of the agreement, resolving disputes, and, most importantly, directly overseeing the delivery of humanitarian aid to Gaza. As a result, although the Israeli army still occupies roughly half of Gaza, its hands are effectively tied; its ability to conduct military responses to any ceasefire violations by Hamas, as well as Netanyahu’s ability to provoke Hamas into resuming hostilities, has been severely limited. Israel can no longer halt humanitarian aid and use it as a political and military leverage.

If Trump succeeds in advancing his objectives, the Israeli army will effectively cede security control of the Gaza Strip to an “international stabilization force.” Even if this multinational force does not fully disarm Hamas, its mere presence and the risk of direct confrontation will almost entirely prevent Israel from conducting large-scale military operations. With this mechanism, Trump has elevated the Gaza issue from a purely Israeli-Palestinian conflict to an international matter, a situation in which Israel can no longer act unilaterally without considering the concerns of external partners.

Changing the Equation: Direct Washington Pressure on Israel-Syria Security Alignment

A similar situation is now emerging in Syria. Israel still occupies parts of Syrian territory, intervened militarily in last July’s internal conflict between Druze and Bedouin groups, and occasionally conducts operations inside Syria. From Tel Aviv’s perspective, maintaining the status quo and military control over the borders is a safer option than relying on a political agreement with Damascus for security.

However, the Trump White House has taken a different approach, pressuring Israel in recent months to reach a “security pact” with the Syrian government. The two sides are now even discussing “alliance formation,” an action that, if realized, would effectively prevent Israeli attacks on Syrian military assets and infrastructure. Such a pact would almost certainly compel Israel to withdraw from occupied areas within Syria and end its role as the “protector of the Druze” in that country.

Following the signing of the agreement, it appears that Trump has no intention of leaving its enforcement to Israel’s “goodwill.” Reuters recently reported that the United States plans to establish a new military deployment at an airbase near Damascus. Unlike other U.S. forces in Syria, whose main mission is monitoring and countering ISIS, the mission of this new unit will be to oversee Israel’s compliance with the agreement.

Trump’s Anger at Netanyahu’s Dangerous Games

The third front where Israel faces a form of “hard restraint” is Qatar. The United States has maintained a significant military presence at Al-Udeid Air Base since the early 2000s. However, following Israel’s failed strike on Hamas leaders in Qatar, Trump became furious and issued an executive order on September 29 stating that “any armed attack on the territory, sovereignty, or critical infrastructure of the State of Qatar will be considered a threat to the peace and security of the United States”—a wording deliberately reminiscent of NATO collective defense clauses. In other words, Hamas leaders in Doha are now effectively under Trump’s direct protection against any potential Israeli attack, in addition to Qatar’s security umbrella.

From Washington’s perspective, the Middle East has always been a stage where crises are “managed” through supporting allies and restraining adversaries rather than fully resolved. Within this framework, whenever Israel entered a war, it was forced to cautiously consider the U.S. position, knowing that Washington would eventually demand halting advances and withdrawing some forces to prevent further destabilization in the region.

However, the key point is that until now, the United States had never undertaken a coordinated and organized effort to establish a network of preemptive restrictions aimed at preventing Israeli military action—a mechanism that, for the first time under Trump, has been seriously implemented, effectively creating a new form of restraint over America’s strategic partner in the Middle East.

Whether the Trump administration deliberately designed such a restraint system for Israel from the outset is unclear. It seems more likely that this situation resulted from a series of gradual reactions to Israel’s repeated extremism, culminating in the failed strike on Qatar, which served as the final and decisive trigger. One individual closely connected to Trump’s National Security team described the environment to Politico: “Every time they make progress, it seems Netanyahu goes and bombs someone. That’s why the president and his advisers are so displeased with Netanyahu.”

Nevertheless, Trump has no inherent objection to using military force; as evidenced, he allowed the Gaza conflict to burn for much of 2025 following the January ceasefire and has not hesitated to leverage U.S. military power.

Among the three arenas where U.S.-Israel confrontation over the choice between “diplomacy or war” is likely, Lebanon has received the least political and operational investment from the White House. Increasing signs indicate that Israel is considering a new military operation to prevent Hezbollah from restoring its armament capabilities. However, at least publicly, Washington has not issued any serious warnings to Tel Aviv. Within this context, Israel’s recent airstrike, conducted without prior U.S. notification and resulting in the killing of Hezbollah’s number-two figure, Ali Tabatabai, can be interpreted as an attempt by Tel Aviv to test the limits and sensitivity of the Trump administration.