Behind-the-scenes deal between Riyadh and Washington/ Is MBS Pushing for a Nuclear Edge?

Nasrollah Tajik writes:Mohammed bin Salman’s trip to the United States is, in truth, intended to continue, implement, and expand the agreements reached during President Trump’s visit to Riyadh six months ago, in May. This trip serves multiple purposes, but it should be viewed in light of the Saudis’ new strategy—one framed within the Vision 2030 plan outlined for Saudi Arabia by McKinsey advisors. The Saudis have adopted this vision as their primary roadmap, distancing from the kingdom all potential factors that could jeopardize its realization.

To achieve the goals of this vision, Mohammed bin Salman first consolidated power by assuming the crown prince position, sidelining other princes and unofficial power centers as well as hardline religious figures. He introduced a secular model, restored authority through centralization, and adopted a “zero tension” policy.

Domestically—faced with multiple fault lines such as succession crises, accumulated social demands from women and youth, and internal family conflicts—he carried out extensive social reforms, including improving the social rights of women and young people, and initiating numerous investments that opened the door for Western participation in entertainment, sports, and arts, thereby delaying the activation of these internal fault lines. This trend can be viewed as a kind of “Saudi glasnost,” or internal liberalization.

Externally, Saudi Arabia sought to restructure its foreign policy, whether through resolving the Yemen crisis directly with Ansarallah, or through rapprochement with Iran based on earlier bilateral security agreements—an effort that had eluded both sides after years of negotiations. Resources previously devoted to foreign engagements—whether in Yemen or other regional arenas—were redirected toward domestic investment and strengthening societal reforms. Therefore, although part of this trip is economic in nature, its political and security implications for the region are highly significant.

Saudi Arabia’s main objective during Trump’s “golden era”—in which he seeks to create a new regional order centered on Israel—is to position itself at the heart of this architecture. The Saudis, who have adopted a policy of balancing East and West and maintain economic and security ties with China and Russia—something Trump does not welcome—wish to become the main pillar of this new security structure. In other words, the Saudis want the U.S. to designate them, not Israel, as the principal regional pillar—replacing Nixon’s pre-revolution “twin pillars” strategy, which originally centered Iran and now seeks to substitute Israel. Whether this will materialize is subject to debate, but the Saudis argue that Israel’s image problem in the region and internationally, especially after its actions in Gaza, makes it an unsuitable anchor for such a model.

The Saudis believe that Trump’s commitment to Israel and Netanyahu makes it difficult for them to secure this role. Meanwhile, Washington faces its own challenges, as recent developments in the Middle East—particularly Iran’s setbacks—have complicated the landscape. Today, actors such as Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and, to some extent, the UAE are all assertive players. This broad regional rivalry has disrupted both the regional balance and the geopolitical landscape, preventing the formation of a new stable order and adding to the “gel-like,” unstable nature of the Middle East.

Egypt maintains its traditional stance of defending the Palestinians and preventing a spillover of the crisis into its own territory. It neither aligns with nor agrees fully with Saudi Arabia and views itself as a competitor. Turkey, seeking economic and territorial advantage reminiscent of post-Ottoman ambitions, also competes with Saudi Arabia, while Israel’s perspective on Turkey remains unfavorable. Israel has shifted from defending its security to pursuing the complete destruction of Palestinians, their supporters, and resistance groups—but still seeks to avoid antagonizing Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia, which holds significant importance to Israel, continues to maintain its regional leverage in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, though it faces strong competitors such as Iran, Egypt, Turkey, and even the UAE. The UAE, in pursuit of a larger regional footprint, has expanded into Yemen, Sudan, and even Iraq and Syria in an effort to carve out a share of regional power. Meanwhile, Iran—despite its setbacks—still retains powerful strategic cards and disruptive capabilities. Though weakened in Syria and partly in Lebanon, it remains an influential actor and must utilize its capabilities to protect its regional and national security interests.

In my view, the Gaza issue is not a central factor in Saudi Arabia’s broader regional ambitions. The Saudis are more focused on their own national interests and have defined policies to pursue them. Saudi officials, including Manal Radwan from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have stated that if a clear timetable is established for Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza, and if this withdrawal connects Gaza to the West Bank to enable the formation of a Palestinian state, Saudi Arabia would consider accepting this framework as part of a normalization process with Israel. However, as long as Netanyahu remains Israel’s prime minister, both the establishment of a Palestinian state and a lasting ceasefire in Gaza remain uncertain.

Therefore, Gaza and the Palestinian issue remain secondary for Saudi-U.S. relations; they do not constitute a determining factor. The Saudis are focused on advancing the 20-point roadmap Trump has proposed.

Although this trip is framed economically, it carries major political and security consequences for the region. Within this context, the demands of both sides come into play. The United States and Trump personally aim to attract Saudi investments; we recall that during Trump’s May visit, deals worth one trillion dollars were announced, later reduced to $600 billion. Trump is eager to bring Saudi capital into the U.S. economy. For the Saudis, with their foreign reserves and experience investing abroad, this is feasible and would also strengthen their security. However, Trump also wants Saudi Arabia to increase oil production and lower global prices—an action that would harm Saudi Arabia financially while boosting the U.S. economy and Trump’s domestic standing.

The second demand is Saudi Arabia’s joining the Abraham Accords.

In my view, as explained earlier, the Saudis are striving to find a form of the agreement that protects their long-term ambitions to become the main pillar of regional security, even if immediate implementation is delayed. To strengthen and facilitate their security and military cooperation with the United States, the Saudis have several key demands aimed at making themselves America’s primary regional partner—not only its economic hub but its main foreign-policy pillar. One such demand is a strong defense and security pact with the United States through a Trump executive order, similar to the Doha–Washington agreement after Israel’s attack on Qatar.

This request depends on the Saudis’ assessments of future regional developments. Following the September 2019 Ansarallah attack on Aramco—which Patriot missiles failed to intercept—they now seek advanced systems such as THAAD and F-35 fighter jets. These systems are unlikely to serve a defensive purpose against Israel; rather, they have clear anti-Iran applications. For instance, comments recently made by Turki al-Faisal at the Manama Security Conference attracted attention in Iran. Tehran is closely and sensitively monitoring this trip, as Saudi Arabia believes the region is moving toward greater tensions and needs stronger self-defense capabilities—not necessarily because of a direct Saudi-Iran conflict, but due to potential Iran-Israel or Iran-U.S. clashes with spillover risks for Saudi Arabia and its neighbors.

A comprehensive regional outlook is therefore necessary to understand how Saudi Arabia is shaping its long-term strategy.

Other Saudi demands include advanced military and defense systems, AI chips, and emerging technologies—issues highlighted in the May agreements. However, the U.S. has so far been cautious in implementing them. Although the two countries announced new cooperation in AI during Trump’s May trip to Riyadh, Washington has not yet issued the necessary export licenses, disappointing the Saudis. The two sides are now working to redefine security parameters for transferring these technologies. Meanwhile, the UAE has already received its first export license under Trump for U.S.-run projects.

Thus, part of bin Salman’s efforts will be dedicated to securing the transfer and deployment of these technologies for strengthening Saudi security and integrating them into domestic defense industries. Another part concerns Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear facilities. In my view, major negotiations on this issue occurred during the Biden administration, but media reports suggest that Saudi Arabia has already engaged foreign companies and governments over recent years to construct nuclear facilities.

A central challenge is drafting a fundamental bilateral agreement for Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear energy program. Any such agreement permitting Saudi Arabia to build nuclear reactors may require Congressional approval. Moreover, Saudi Arabia has long sought U.S. assistance for nuclear capabilities—including uranium enrichment—despite Washington’s security concerns. During the Biden administration, advanced negotiations took place on a binding defense pact and a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement in exchange for Saudi normalization with Israel, but these talks stalled after Hamas’s 7 October 2023 attack.

For years, despite its own behind-the-scenes efforts to hinder the JCPOA, Saudi Arabia openly pressured the U.S. that if Iran were allowed certain nuclear rights—such as enrichment under the JCPOA—Saudi Arabia must also receive identical rights. Today, Saudi Arabia maintains both public and, according to some reports, covert nuclear enrichment activities.

Saudi Arabia plans to build two nuclear power plants by 2020 and 16 by 2030. Although Riyadh officially denies seeking nuclear weapons and has signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, its progress depends on Iran’s nuclear capacity, and informal reports indicate Saudi activity in this domain. Should these projects advance, regional nuclear competition would likely intensify.

Iran’s role—and recent U.S. and Israeli attacks on three Iranian nuclear facilities—has shrouded these developments in uncertainty, and time is needed for clarity. Trump’s ability to maneuver is also constrained, because granting nuclear concessions to Saudi Arabia while maintaining a “zero enrichment” policy toward Iran would involve serious limitations.

Thus, this trip is fraught with conflicting demands from both sides, and its outcome depends on the degree of flexibility each is willing to show in giving and receiving concessions. The trip, not yet finalized, has already generated significant media controversy in the Arab world—from renewed discussion of the Khashoggi killing by agents of Mohammed bin Salman to doubts over whether the visit will even proceed, and speculation that Trump might use extravagant protocol to flatter the prince and obscure contradictions between the two sides’ objectives while projecting strength to his rivals, the Arab and Islamic world, and domestic opponents.