A Breathless Drone Battle; A Heated Winter on the Threshold of Cold

Local Ukrainian officials announced that during Russia’s overnight assault early Friday, a large number of missiles and drones struck Kyiv. According to the New York Times, the attack left six people dead and caused fires in several buildings across the city. Observers claim this is the latest in a series of Russian airstrikes that typically target Ukraine’s power infrastructure in an effort to plunge citizens into cold and darkness as winter approaches. The report added that Russia’s latest attacks also targeted Kharkiv in northeastern Ukraine, causing restrictions in electricity supply and disruptions in water services. Nonetheless, Kyiv appeared to be the main focus of the attacks. Ukraine’s Air Force stated that Russia used 19 missiles and 430 drones in the assault.

According to the newspaper Rokna, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said on social media: “This was a calculated and deliberate attack intended to inflict the greatest possible damage on civilians and non-military infrastructure.” According to Zelensky, Ukraine will respond to these attacks with doubled force. The report suggested that this statement likely refers to Kyiv’s campaign of broad attacks on Russia’s oil infrastructure, aimed at reducing the Kremlin’s energy revenues. Meanwhile, Russian officials in the southwestern Krasnodar region earlier announced an attack on the port of Novorossiysk in the Black Sea, where Ukrainian drones damaged an oil depot, a container terminal, and coastal facilities.

Escalating Confrontations: Ukraine and Russia Locked in Cycles of Retaliatory Attacks

In recent weeks, Ukrainian forces have expanded the scope of their offensive campaign and have also targeted Russia’s power network; several substations and a thermal power plant have been hit, resulting in temporary blackouts. Some analysts claim that the purpose of these attacks is to impose pressure on Russian citizens while demonstrating Ukraine’s ability to retaliate. However, this group simultaneously acknowledges that Russia still maintains superiority in the air war.

In just the past month, Russia has launched more than 5,500 attack drones and decoy drones toward Ukraine, forcing the country to keep its skies in a constant defensive posture almost every night. In addition, according to data released by Ukraine’s Air Force and reviewed by the New York Times, nearly 270 missiles were fired during this period — the highest number in a single month since early 2024. Zelensky has long urged Ukraine’s Western allies to provide additional air-defense systems.

He has stated that he intends to order Patriot systems from the United States, each of which costs at least one billion dollars to produce. Kyiv, which has endured nearly four years of war and faces severe financial constraints, is compelled to request European partners to fund these systems. According to Politico, Zelensky — who has consistently stated that Ukraine will respond to Kremlin attacks with long-range strikes on Russian territory — again urged the world to halt Moscow through sanctions and to strengthen Kyiv’s air-defense capabilities.

According to Zelensky, Russia is still able to sell oil and pursue its plans, and all of this must be stopped. The Guardian meanwhile reported that Ukrainian forces earlier used the “Flamingo” cruise missile alongside domestically produced drones to strike targets inside Russian territory. Ukraine’s FP-5 missile has a flight range of up to 3,000 kilometers (1,864 miles) and can land within 14 meters (45 feet) of its target. According to the report and expert assessments, this missile is among the largest of its type globally and can carry a 1,150-kilogram (2,535-pound) warhead.

Observers claim this missile is partly a substitute for the advanced Tomahawk missiles that the United States has so far refrained from delivering to Ukraine. Ukraine’s General Staff announced that its forces targeted a maritime oil terminal in Crimea, a helicopter parking area and drone storage facilities, training zones at Kirovsk Airport, and an air-defense radar station in Yevpatoria using these missiles.

Corruption and Internal Instability Prevent Ukraine from Achieving Decisive Superiority

Al Jazeera reported that Ukraine faces internal challenges, including corruption scandals involving allies of President Volodymyr Zelensky, leaving the frontline in an unstable condition and likely preventing either side from achieving decisive superiority. In this context, both Russia and Ukraine have repeatedly seized and lost individual buildings and neighborhoods. “Hoss,” commander of a drone team from the 68th Jaeger Brigade near Pokrovsk, told Reuters: “One building is in our hands, the next one is occupied by Russia, and within hours their positions switch.” Nonetheless, Russian forces appear to be gradually advancing.

Ukrainian forces told Reuters that the defense of Pokrovsk is steadily weakening. Meanwhile, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that its troops are advancing in Pokrovsk amid house-to-house battles. According to some observers, these tactics allowed Russian forces to seize control of central Pokrovsk in early November and last week attempt to push further east and west.

In Myrnohrad, east of Pokrovsk, Russian troops continued penetrating eastern parts of the city, achieving limited advances on its northern edge this week, while Ukrainian defenders held most of the city firmly. However, both cities remain vulnerable, encircled by Russian forces from the north, south, and east, leaving only the western route for supply and evacuation. The Institute for the Study of War in Washington wrote that the operational significance of Russia’s capture of these cities depends on whether Ukrainian forces conduct an orderly withdrawal or a chaotic retreat, as well as on Russia’s ability to exploit the collapse of defenses and conduct a successful pursuit.

On Saturday, Axios reported that the U.S. government shutdown may have delayed the delivery of $5 billion in weapons systems to NATO allies and Ukraine, although the report noted this has no direct connection to the defense of Pokrovsk. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed to have seized Ospenovka, Novoye, and Sladkoye in Zaporizhzhia, Velchy in Dnipropetrovsk, and Gnatovka in Donetsk.

The Vital Role of the United States in Sustaining Ukraine’s Resistance

Ron Wahid, CEO of Magellan Investment Holdings and chairman of strategic intelligence firm Arcanum, who recently returned from war-torn Pokrovsk after direct talks with General Oleksandr Syrskyi, Commander-in-Chief of Ukraine’s Armed Forces, told The Washington Post: “It became clear to me that even if Pokrovsk ultimately falls, its fall will come at a heavy cost to Russia, and Moscow will continue to suffer painful losses for every additional meter of Ukrainian territory.” According to him, despite the remarkable bravery of Ukrainian forces, the outcome of the war remains uncertain, and U.S. assistance continues to be critical.

According to The Washington Post, Donald Trump’s recent decision to refrain from sending Tomahawk cruise missiles was a sign of strategic caution and is considered the correct decision. The United States must continue supporting Ukraine’s defensive capabilities, but delivering Tomahawks — which are difficult to operate and integrate — is not justified. Instead, the focus should be on supplying weapons that can be used immediately; combined with intensified economic pressure, Moscow will be forced to agree to a negotiated settlement to end the conflict without dragging Washington into a dangerous cycle of escalation.

Observers believe Ukraine has so far demonstrated extraordinary adaptability and ingenuity. Domestically produced long-range drones have struck targets deep inside Russia, and the United States should help strengthen these emerging capabilities. Cooperation in related innovations not only aids Ukraine in today’s battle but also offers lessons for the U.S. military in dealing with future adversaries. The report added that Ukraine urgently needs additional tools to halt Russia’s ground advances and disrupt air attacks at their source.

Effective systems compatible with Ukraine’s existing equipment are available. The ERAM (Extended Range Attack Munition), which can be used with Ukraine’s F-16 jets, has a range of about 280 miles. Germany’s Taurus cruise missiles have a range of more than 300 miles and are designed to penetrate heavily fortified targets. These weapons could improve Ukraine’s ability to strike advancing Russian forces, logistics centers, supply lines, and command posts.

However, according to The Washington Post, the risk of increasing pressure on Russia is that it may tempt both sides into further escalation. Therefore, Ukraine must pursue a strategy that preserves its sovereignty while always providing Russia with a credible exit option. Acceptance of any territorial compromise must be accompanied by securing Ukraine’s long-term future through deeper security and economic integration with Western partners. In any case, U.S. participation in any agreement is essential. To strengthen America’s position, especially as an economic partner, Ukraine must also implement major reforms, and what matters greatly is strong and decisive strategic support.

The United States and Management of the Ukraine War

In this context, Rebecca Lissner, senior fellow in U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations and deputy assistant to the president in the Biden administration, wrote in Foreign Affairs: “During his 2024 campaign, Donald Trump assured voters that he would end the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, yet both conflicts have continued, with diplomatic efforts progressing only sporadically and irregularly.” However, the reasons behind these failures are not limited to Trump alone. The difficulty of ending these wars — particularly the war in Ukraine — reveals America’s strategic challenges in managing a small group of partners known as “quasi-allies.” These “quasi-allies,” part of the U.S. alliance network since World War II, occupy a position higher than ordinary partners but are not formal allies.

They hold special importance in Washington, yet they lack one of the key attributes of a genuine alliance: a formal U.S. security guarantee. Recent conflicts in Ukraine have made “quasi-allies” central to American foreign policy. The United States has supported Ukraine in resisting Russia’s attempt to dominate the country, providing billions of dollars in advanced weaponry to its armed forces. Ukraine has managed to preserve its sovereignty and political independence, while Russia has suffered material losses — all without direct military confrontation between Moscow and Washington. This experience demonstrates the benefits of supporting powerful quasi-allies on the front lines of geopolitics: these relationships enable the U.S. to pursue its interests in sensitive and vital regions through indirect and lower-cost means. However, America’s attempts to manage its role in these wars also highlight the inherent strategic challenges of quasi-alliances. If Trump seeks to achieve his goal of securing peace in Europe, his administration must manage these challenges more effectively.

On the Global Network of Allies: The Line Between Commitment and Ambiguity

In its wide network of international relations, Washington classifies most countries either as “allies” or “partners.” Washington commits to its allies through legal treaties that include mutual defense clauses. This commitment — which regards an attack on one as an attack on all — guarantees allies’ security and extends America’s nuclear umbrella. In contrast, partners may receive U.S. security assistance but cannot be certain that the U.S. military will intervene in case of attack. “Quasi-allies” may receive extensive military training and assistance, host large numbers of U.S. troops, and maintain close coordination with Washington, but they do not receive a formal security guarantee. Unlike “partners,” the scale of Washington’s investment in quasi-allies creates ambiguity, as it remains unclear to what extent the U.S. would defend them if attacked. Nonetheless, there are good reasons why the U.S. refrains from offering the kind of mutual defense commitment that formal alliances require — including concerns about entanglement in highly tense regions, provoking adversaries, or committing to defend a country that may not follow Washington’s preferred policies.

This ambiguity means quasi-alliances provide weaker deterrence and security assurances than formal alliances, explaining why “quasi-allies” are more vulnerable to external aggression. During the 2022 Russia-Ukraine war, Ukrainian and U.S. military commanders jointly designed a strategy to break Russian defensive lines in Kherson and seize territories that would allow Ukrainian forces to sever the land bridge between Crimea and other occupied areas of Ukraine. However, the plan faced Ukraine’s internal realities: avoiding extreme human casualties and breaching Russian defensive lines would have been exceedingly bloody, and rivalries among Ukrainian military commanders and political leaders complicated execution. Despite careful joint planning, U.S. policymakers could not compel Ukraine to carry out the operation. Moreover, the United States may not always share the same assessment of escalation risks with its quasi-allies. While Washington may have strong strategic interests in the outcomes of wars involving quasi-allies, it can calibrate its involvement. For a “quasi-ally,” the stakes are always higher and often existential. They may be willing to take risks that could significantly escalate the crisis.

In the Biden administration, Ukrainian leaders have consistently presented long lists of requests for advanced weapons systems. But Biden officials believed that supplying these weapons would pose risks to U.S. military readiness and heighten the possibility of escalation. When Biden approved the limited delivery of ATACMS to Ukraine in April 2024 — with clear restrictions on their use — these weapons provided tactical benefits but no significant strategic breakthrough. A similar dynamic occurred, although less publicly, when Ukraine repeatedly sought permission to use American equipment to strike Russian territory, eventually securing limited U.S. approval. In both cases, Ukraine was willing to take risks in pursuit of military gains or morale-boosting victories and would likely have welcomed direct U.S. military involvement, whereas Washington sought to meet Kyiv’s military needs while avoiding escalation that could draw the U.S. or NATO directly into the war. Efforts to resolve these tensions produced policies suboptimal for both sides: Washington accepted more risk than it preferred, but not enough to give Ukraine a decisive advantage.

A Smart Strategy: The Key to Successfully Ending the Ukraine War

The relationship between the United States and its quasi-ally — especially in wartime — is a pivotal axis: if this relationship deteriorates, the resulting gap benefits the adversary. When quasi-allies are engaged in prolonged wars, the most effective way for the U.S. to achieve a favorable outcome is either to help its partner win outright or to convince the enemy that support will continue until a satisfactory peace agreement is reached. These dynamics make managing vital military assistance as a tool to shape a quasi-ally’s conduct and acceptance of peace more difficult, complicating efforts to end wars that involve U.S. support for quasi-allies.

In his efforts to end the Ukraine war, Trump calculated that Ukraine’s dependence on the United States would allow him to pressure Kyiv into accepting a peace agreement heavily favoring Moscow. He tested this idea by publicly criticizing Zelensky in the Oval Office and then cutting military and intelligence aid. Rather than forcing Ukraine into concessions, this move only highlighted the weakness in Kyiv-Washington relations during Trump’s presidency and encouraged the Kremlin to persist with its rigid diplomatic strategy and increased military pressure. The strategic challenges quasi-alliances pose to policymakers are a constant source of frustration. Ending the Ukraine war on favorable terms also requires the United States to manage these dilemmas intelligently. In this regard, it is essential that strong support for “quasi-allies” is clearly communicated to the American public — explained and justified — without creating binding commitments