Why Does the U.S. Block Negotiations with Iran?
Rokna Political Desk – A report by The American Conservative, criticizing the United States’ dual-track strategy toward Iran, stresses that combining “maximum pressure” with an invitation to negotiate undermines the effectiveness of diplomacy, while military strikes and nuclear absolutism further reduce the chances of an agreement.

According to The American Conservative magazine, Leon Hadar, Senior Research Fellow for the Middle East Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, wrote that the current trajectory of U.S.–Iran relations remains a reflection of the long-standing struggle between idealism and the realist imperatives that have shaped U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East for decades.
Today, with the return of the Trump-style “maximum pressure” policy alongside simultaneous diplomatic activity, this reality is once again underscored: geopolitical considerations often outweigh ideological priorities. The glaring contradiction in Trump’s strategy—linking severe sanctions with a call for direct negotiations—signals a misunderstanding of the real logic of “coercive diplomacy,” which can only succeed under a carefully balanced mix of pressure and concessions.
The Dangerous Game of Pressure and Negotiation; The Vicious Cycle of U.S. Policy Toward Iran
The recent negotiations between Tehran and Washington, which began in April 2025 following a letter sent by Donald Trump to Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, the Leader of Iran, progressed while the “maximum pressure” policy was simultaneously revived. This dual approach reflects the long-held belief in U.S. policymaking that economic sanctions can pave the way for a meaningful breakthrough in talks.
However, historical experience points to a different path. The JCPOA was concluded only when tangible sanctions relief was offered as a real concession in exchange for Iran’s nuclear limitations. When maximum pressure remains in place alongside expectations for Tehran to make nuclear concessions, the outcome is not an incentive for cooperation but rather the creation of reverse incentives—driving Iran toward reduced compliance instead of greater adherence.
The U.S. bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities in June 2025 marked a dangerous turning point in the dispute, severely undermining the prospect of any negotiated settlement. Such military attacks—regardless of tactical justifications—send the clear message that Washington views Iran primarily as a security threat, rather than as a potential diplomatic actor.
This shift toward militarism reflects a long-standing tendency in U.S. foreign policy to replace negotiation with the use of force. Experience has shown that such strikes, rather than paving the way for dialogue, harden positions on both sides, making a dignified and lasting agreement even more difficult to achieve.
Nuclear Absolutism: Why Does the U.S. Close the Path to Negotiations with Iran?
The dimension of Israel–Iran tensions adds a fresh layer of complexity to the U.S.–Iran equation—one that American policymakers have long preferred to overlook. Donald Trump’s announcement of a ceasefire between the two parties suggests an acknowledgment in Washington that regional conflicts cannot be divorced from the framework of U.S.–Iran bilateral relations. Nonetheless, the entrenched pattern of U.S. foreign policy still rests on unconditional alignment with allies, even when such alignment comes at the expense of strategic coherence and effectiveness.
A genuinely realist approach recognizes that while Israeli and American interests regarding Iran overlap in some areas, they are not necessarily identical. Israel’s existential concerns over Tehran’s regional influence may at times conflict with Washington’s priorities of Middle East stability and nuclear non-proliferation. Bridging this gap requires acknowledging that unconditional support for all of Israel’s positions does not necessarily serve the United States’ broader and long-term strategic goals.
Iran’s nuclear program remains at the center of the dispute, yet the prevailing discourse in Washington frames it in absolutist terms that effectively block any negotiated compromise. Insistence on the complete dismantling of Tehran’s nuclear capacity, coupled with continued economic pressure, overlooks a core reality: the Islamic Republic has fundamentally developed this capability as a deterrent and as a means to counter such pressures.
Washington’s Roadmap: How Should Engagement with Iran Be Conducted?
A more pragmatic approach accepts that preserving some of Iran’s nuclear capacity may be inevitable and, instead of total elimination, focuses on establishing effective monitoring and verification mechanisms that can detect any move toward weaponization in time. The objective should be to manage the nuclear file, not to eradicate it entirely. Meanwhile, the effectiveness of sanctions is overestimated in Washington’s strategic thinking.
While economic pressure can impose costs on the target state, it rarely produces fundamental changes in its policies—as Iran’s case has shown. Tehran has displayed remarkable resilience against sanctions by relying on alternative economic partnerships and strengthening domestic capabilities.
Globally, dissatisfaction with U.S. secondary sanctions is mounting—restrictions that target not only Iran but also the economic opportunities of other countries. Resistance from Europe, China, and Russia to Washington’s Iran policy stems not merely from disagreements over Iran, but also from deeper concerns about the growing use of economic coercion as a tool of foreign policy.
A realist approach to dealing with Iran must begin with a clear assessment of U.S. interests and capabilities. Washington undoubtedly has legitimate concerns over Tehran’s regional behavior and nuclear activities, but it possesses limited tools to fundamentally alter Iran’s domestic and foreign policy solely through external pressure.
This necessitates several policy adjustments:
A – Differentiated Engagement: U.S. policy toward Iran should move away from a one-size-fits-all approach and distinguish between core security threats—such as efforts to acquire nuclear weapons or direct threats to U.S. forces—and broader regional rivalries that can be managed through diplomacy.
B – Conditional Reciprocity: Rather than insisting on unilateral concessions, Washington should design packages of mutual give-and-take that address both sides’ vital concerns—for example, imposing nuclear restrictions in exchange for sanctions relief, or altering Iran’s regional posture in exchange for U.S. diplomatic recognition.
C – Alliance Management: U.S. policy should recognize that full alignment with Israel’s priorities may sometimes conflict with the overarching goal of regional stability. This reality requires Washington to hold frank and direct discussions with its allies on trade-offs, costs, and priorities.
D – Realistic Timelines: Fundamental change in U.S.–Iran relations is a multi-year process, not a project for a few months. However, domestic political cycles in the United States create constant pressure for immediate results—a pressure at odds with the patient, gradual diplomacy needed for sustainable agreements.
The present moment in U.S.–Iran relations carries both the seeds of opportunity and the risk of escalation. The willingness of both parties to initiate direct talks, even amid ongoing tensions, shows that the diplomatic path remains open. Yet the simultaneous intensification of military and economic pressure generates conflicting currents that can easily nullify any political progress. Success in this path requires Washington to abandon the mistaken belief that unilateral pressure can compel Tehran into submission, and to accept that lasting agreement emerges only through mutual compromise.
Acknowledging this reality may be politically difficult in the U.S. domestic arena, but it is the only realistic option for managing one of the most sensitive relationships in contemporary international affairs. The alternative—a continuation of cycles of escalation and temporary crisis management—serves neither U.S. interests nor regional stability. A mature foreign policy recognizes limitations and redefines its strategy accordingly.
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