Millions Face Imminent Water Shortages

According to Rokna’s social affairs correspondent: Only 5% of Iran’s Food Security Plan Implemented Amid Ongoing Water Crisis; Flawed Governance, Marginalized Farmers, and Unabated Emergency. Despite the ratification of a National Food Security Strategy outlining water consumption quotas for each government body, only 5% of the plan has been implemented. Water management within agriculture remains unaddressed, with farmers excluded from decision-making processes. The law for forming Water Users’ Cooperatives, intended to foster participatory management and efficient usage, has never moved beyond the paper stage. Meanwhile, costly water transfer projects, which meet only a fraction of actual demand, have underscored the urgent need to reform governance models and overhaul Iran’s water management structure.

Changing individual officials—such as impeaching the Minister of Energy—may yield superficial results. The real solution, Hajikarim argues, lies in restructuring governance and establishing independent regulatory bodies with genuine stakeholder participation.

4 Million Iranians Face Serious Water Supply Threats by 2036

Rokna Reporter: In recent years, Iran's water crisis has evolved into one of the most acute and pervasive national challenges. Despite decades of warnings from both domestic and international experts, the country still lacks a comprehensive, enforceable national water management policy. Today, Iran's water sustainability status ranges from “orange” to “red,” with crisis indicators visible across nearly every region—from the humid northern provinces to the arid central, eastern, and southern regions.

Hajikarim: Contrary to public perception, Iran has developed numerous water management plans—some of which are quantitatively and qualitatively sound. However, the chronic absence of implementation has rendered these plans ineffective. While the Ministry of Energy is formally tasked with managing water, in practice, nearly 90% of Iran’s water resources are consumed by the Ministry of Agriculture—not by industry or urban sectors.

Industrial Water Use Stands at Just 3.7 Billion Cubic Meters Annually – Urban Use at 9 Billion

To illustrate, Hajikarim notes that industrial water use amounts to approximately 3.7 billion cubic meters per year, and urban consumption totals about 9 billion cubic meters. By contrast, a staggering 81 billion cubic meters are consumed by agriculture. This vast agricultural consumption—conducted without alignment to regional capacities or climate realities—has turned the water crisis into a structural conflict between ministries.

Even water-abundant provinces such as Gilan and Mazandaran, which receive up to 2,000 mm of annual rainfall, are not immune. Areas like Bandar Anzali, Lahijan, Rudbar, Tehran, Sistan and Baluchestan, and Khuzestan—which alone holds one-third of Iran’s fresh water reserves—are all grappling with significant water stress, a direct result of ignoring expert warnings.

Iran Extracts Triple the Permitted Amount from Its Renewable Water Resources

Globally, no country is advised to consume more than 40% of its renewable water resources. In Iran, the renewable capacity is estimated at 100 billion cubic meters per year. Thus, the safe limit would be 40 billion. However, Iran is extracting nearly double that—and even threefold, in some estimations.

Only 5% of the National Water Reduction Mandates Have Been Executed

The National Food Security Strategy, adopted by the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, clearly defines reduction targets for water consumption across ministries, including Energy, Agriculture, and Industry. Yet two years after its passage, only 5% of its directives have been implemented.

Changing Ministers Will Not Solve Agricultural Water Mismanagement

Rokna Reporter: Water mismanagement in agriculture has persisted across successive governments. Environmental organizations and experts have issued countless warnings, all of which appear to have been ignored—suggesting that the crisis transcends individual administrations.

Hajikarim: Replacing the Minister of Agriculture won’t resolve the issue—just as past ministers failed to deliver meaningful outcomes. The real failure lies in the systemic exclusion of farmers from water management processes.

With the Demise of Qanats, Participatory Governance Has Also Perished

Historically, Iran’s agricultural water management was centered around qanats—traditional irrigation systems supported by robust social participation. These systems facilitated community-based decision-making on water usage. Today, that structure has collapsed, and without farmer engagement, any hope of resolving the water crisis remains elusive.

No Will to Enforce Laws – Private Sector Voices Silenced

Hajikarim points to Article 26 of the 2009 Law on Agricultural and Natural Resource Productivity, which obliges the government to establish Water Users’ Cooperatives. These cooperatives were designed to serve as intermediaries between the state and farmers, allowing water to be distributed volumetrically rather than through outdated practices.

In areas such as Qazvin, for instance, such a cooperative would allow the Ministry of Energy to transfer water in bulk to a central body, which would then manage distribution based on local priorities and efficiency metrics.

But none of this has materialized. Subsistence farmers—whose livelihoods depend on daily crop yields—are expected to conserve water without any support or economic incentives.

Absent Market Incentives – Farmers Neither Encouraged Nor Rewarded for Efficiency

Hajikarim argues that had these cooperatives been established, farmers could be rewarded for saving water through market mechanisms. He references North’s Rule, which asserts that no policy should override market logic. Instead, market forces should drive efficient consumption.

Tehran Water Transfer from Taleghan Covers Less Than 7% of the Capital’s Needs

He dismisses the Ministry of Energy’s claim of transferring 2.5 cubic meters of water daily from Taleghan to Tehran, citing the limited availability of water in Taleghan itself. Even if accurate, this would amount to just 80 million cubic meters annually—barely 7% of Tehran’s consumption, which exceeds 1.1 billion cubic meters.

Tehran Consumes 2 Billion Cubic Meters of Agricultural Water – Seawater Desalination for Kerman Costs €3.5–4 per Cubic Meter

Meanwhile, agricultural consumption in Tehran Province alone reaches nearly 2 billion cubic meters. Yet Iran continues to desalinate and transport seawater at exorbitant costs—€3.5 to €4 per cubic meter—to inland provinces like Kerman, which themselves consume over 5 billion cubic meters annually in agriculture.

Zabol-to-Mashhad Water Transfer Project Economically Illogical

The proposed transfer of 150 million cubic meters of water from Zabol to Mashhad is dwarfed by the 5 billion cubic meters consumed annually by agriculture in the region. A mere 5% increase in irrigation efficiency would save 250 million cubic meters—far exceeding the total transfer volume, and at a fraction of the cost.

Iran’s Water Governance Model: Ineffective and Dysfunctional

Regarding recent parliamentary moves to impeach the Minister of Energy, Hajikarim questions why the Agriculture Minister—responsible for 90% of water consumption—is not being scrutinized. He suggests merging the ministries of Energy and Agriculture into a single, coherent water management body.

Supreme Water Council Meets Once or Twice a Year – Private Sector Excluded Entirely

He criticizes the Supreme Water Council for its infrequent meetings—once or twice a year—even amid crisis. Moreover, private sector representatives, including himself, are never invited to participate. The result is a lack of actionable, evidence-based policymaking.

Competing Ministries: One Controls Supply, the Other Consumes 90%

The Minister of Energy, responsible for water provision, sits beside the Minister of Agriculture, whose ministry consumes 90% of the resource. The Agriculture Ministry, however, is driven by production targets for strategic goods like wheat, sugar, and meat—without regard to hydrological realities.

Even Replacing Five Ministers Won’t Solve the Water Crisis

Rokna Social Desk –
Reza Hajikarim, President of the Iranian Water Industry Federation, continued his remarks by criticizing superficial approaches to the idea of impeaching the Minister of Energy or the Minister of Agriculture. He emphasized that Iran’s water crisis is fundamentally a management and structural issue, not merely the result of an individual’s performance or that of a single ministry.

“If an impeachment is to take place, it must first be clarified which minister is responsible for negligence,” he said. “Has the Minister of Energy failed in his duties, or has it been the Minister of Agriculture? If we tasked the Minister of Energy with managing water supply and he carried out that task, then we must thoroughly investigate where the shortfall occurred. But even assuming a failure of duty, I am opposed to impeachment at this time. Impeachment under current conditions amounts to sweeping the garbage under the rug. The problem will not be resolved—it will merely be postponed.”

Governance Reform Is the Only Real Solution

In Hajikarim’s view, the solution to the water crisis in Iran lies not in replacing individuals but in a serious restructuring of the country's water governance framework.

“Water is a multidimensional issue—a ‘multi’ issue, as we call it. It cannot be managed in closed-door meetings and councils held behind closed doors, without the participation of real stakeholders,” he said. “The model we’ve followed so far has led only to the current crisis. If we are to achieve a different outcome, we must fundamentally transform both our structure and our operational approach.”

What If the President Asked for a Way Out?

The journalist then posed a question to Hajikarim: “If today, for instance, President Pezeshkian were to ask you for a blueprint to resolve the water crisis, what would be your first priority?”

Hajikarim’s response was unequivocal:
“Resolving this crisis requires the withdrawal of the government from direct control. Wherever the government has intervened, it has caused problems. There’s a famous saying: ‘If you give the government the task of managing desert sand, it won’t be long before it runs out of sand grains.’ The first precondition for overcoming the crisis is that the government must step back from direct management. We have no choice but to transfer responsibility to the private sector—but not just any privatization. It must occur within a participatory framework that includes all genuine stakeholders.”

He referred to this framework as a “regulatory authority”, or “regulator”, explaining that it is a globally proven model and is explicitly mentioned in Article 48 of the Seventh Development Plan.

“If this independent regulatory body is activated,” he continued, “private sector investors, agricultural associations, and all real stakeholders will be able to participate in water policy and management. In that case, optimal resource management will finally become possible.”

From California to Kerman: Global and Domestic Models

Citing the example of California in the United States, Hajikarim stated:
“In California, by reforming their water management structure, they managed to reduce water consumption by 30% while simultaneously increasing agricultural output by 40%. This means that the farmer is both a true stakeholder and a party harmed by poor management. Under the current model, we merely label farmers as the culprits—while they are, in fact, driven by subsistence needs. It’s unreasonable to expect them to optimize consumption without being included in management processes.”

Iran’s Water Crisis Arrived Sooner Than 2033

The President of the Water Industry Federation also referenced presentations he gave last year before the Iranian Chamber of Commerce and the Supreme Leader’s Economic Office:
“In that presentation, we forecasted that the country would enter a severe water crisis by 2033—a crisis in which demand outstrips available resources. But even then, we warned that this crisis would undoubtedly arrive earlier. Studies by the National Water Center, the Agricultural Commission of Iran’s Chamber of Commerce, and the Parliamentary Research Center all indicated both a sharp drop in rainfall and a steep temperature rise—while no effective consumption management has been put in place.”

Iran Owes 150 Billion Cubic Meters to Its Aquifers

He emphasized that the early signs of crisis began in 2025 (1404 in the Persian calendar) and have now become glaringly apparent:
“We currently owe 150 billion cubic meters to the country’s aquifers—and each year, this figure increases by another 5 billion cubic meters. Some studies estimate the figure as high as 350 billion. This amounts to an environmental collapse on a national scale.”

By 2036, Water Supply for 4 Million Iranians Will Be at Serious Risk

According to Hajikarim, 67% of Iran’s wetlands—including Lake Urmia—have either already disappeared or are on the verge of complete desiccation. Wetlands such as Anzali are also nearing extinction.

He warned:
“Iran’s aquifers are being destroyed one by one. By 2036 (1415), water supply for 4 million Iranians will be in serious jeopardy. In addition, 3.5 million job opportunities will be lost. These are not fabricated figures; they are the conclusions of technical, peer-reviewed reports—reports that the highest levels of government are fully aware of.”