Will Iran and the United States Retreat From Their Positions?

From the perspective of international relations studies, the current state of the Iran–US file can be described within the framework of a “multi-layered strategic suspension”; a condition that neither signifies a definitive move toward military confrontation nor reflects a clear indication of a sustainable return to diplomacy, but rather represents the simultaneous convergence of three conflicting yet interconnected logics.

According to Rokna, first is the logic of raw power and deterrence. Donald Trump’s direct statements about the possibility of renewed attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities and missile program are not merely a publicity gesture. These remarks can be understood within a traditional framework of US foreign policy in which “peace” is not seen as the product of mutual trust-building, but as the outcome of imposing power on an adversary. In this view, military threats are used not necessarily for execution, but to shape the other side’s behavior and impose psychological and calculative costs.

Second is the crisis of legitimacy and effectiveness of negotiations. In Iran’s domestic sphere, skepticism toward the very principle of negotiating with the United States is no longer merely an ideological stance, but has gradually become an objective reality. The US withdrawal from the JCPOA, Europe’s inability to play an independent role, the continuation of economic pressure even during periods of dialogue, and ultimately US alignment during Israel’s 12-day war against Iran have reinforced the perception that negotiation, at least in its current form, is incapable of producing “reliable security” or “sustainable economic relief.”

Third, and at the same time the most decisive layer, is the structural inevitability of dialogue. Despite the language of threats, maximum pressure, and deep mistrust, neither side is exempt from the logic of negotiation. The United States clearly understands that a renewed resort to war could destabilize the region and generate major economic and security shocks worldwide. Conversely, Iran cannot remain indifferent to diplomacy.

Peace From the Barrel of a Gun: Trump’s Narrative of Coercive Diplomacy

On Thursday night, 20 Azar local time, US President Donald Trump, in a meeting with a group of reporters at the White House, described the attack on the Islamic Republic’s nuclear facilities as “paving the way for peace.” He claimed that the operation constituted the “most complete destruction of Iran’s nuclear capacity,” which, according to him, made peace “possible,” because “before that everyone was afraid of Iran, and now they are no longer afraid.” This position reflects an approach in foreign policy in which military power is presented not as a last resort, but as the primary tool of deterrence.

In another part of his remarks, Donald Trump claimed that Iran is now willing to enter negotiations with his administration. He said: “They very much want to make a deal with me. And if we can, I would very much like to make a deal with them. Before the bombing, we were reasonably close to a deal.” This narrative seeks to portray military action not as an obstacle to diplomacy, but as an accelerating factor toward reaching an agreement; a message based on the idea that “maximum pressure” and military action can smooth the path to dialogue. However, critics argue that such framing does not fully align with the complex realities of diplomacy and the logic of Iran’s reciprocal responses.

Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s foreign minister, in response to a question about the possibility of resuming negotiations with the United States, emphasized that the final decision depends on Washington’s behavior. According to him, if the US changes its approach and demonstrates readiness to enter “fair and balanced” talks, Tehran will also be prepared for dialogue. He went on to note that Iran does not have a positive memory of negotiating with the United States and cited several examples to explain this distrust: first, the 2015 nuclear agreement, which the US, in his words, withdrew from “without any reason.” He then referred to the 2025 negotiations, saying that while talks were underway, Israel attacked Iran with US support, and the US itself joined those attacks. Araghchi also placed the negotiations held months ago in New York over the “snapback” issue within the same pattern.

Araghchi further stated that Tehran has concluded that the Americans are currently not prepared to enter a “mutually beneficial negotiation” based on equality and mutual respect. He stressed that whenever Iran reaches the conclusion that Washington is genuinely ready for such a framework, the possibility of resuming talks will exist. According to him, the main issue is that “negotiation” is different from “dictation,” and Iran is not convinced that the American side has stepped forward for a serious and genuine negotiation, as they seek to issue instructions rather than engage in dialogue, and he emphasized that no one accepts dictation from others.

Iran–US Deadlock: Mutual Resistance and the Impossibility of Concessions

In continuation of this tense atmosphere, an international relations analyst pointed to the evident uncertainty currently surrounding Iran–US negotiations and said that negotiation in itself is neither “good” nor “bad.” Countries sometimes welcome negotiations to achieve a specific goal and secure their interests. From this perspective, he attempts to remove the discussion of negotiations from value judgments and define it within the framework of calculation and national interest.

The analyst emphasized that for two countries to sit at the negotiating table, complete trust is not necessarily required, explaining that the parties do not need to enter talks with a fully positive mindset or absolute trust.

Regarding the specific dynamic between Iran and the United States, he stressed that the main problem is that neither Iran nor the US is willing to retreat even one step from their positions, and the tangible reality is that under no circumstances do the two sides want or are able to meet each other’s expectations. Since an agreement with the United States cannot be relied upon as a dependable pillar, the governance system must have a “Plan B” for managing the country under sanctions; a plan capable of making the existing conditions as low-cost and manageable as possible.

According to an analysis published in The Economist, the US administration needs a more direct action to overcome the current deadlock. The magazine believes Washington should send a special envoy to Tehran to assess on the ground whether a real agreement is possible. This proposal reflects doubts about the effectiveness of pressure and sanctions alone. In Washington, Donald Trump has once again spoken of his “full readiness to reach a deal with Iran.” According to media reports, he seeks to present himself as a president who managed to achieve a major and historic agreement. However, some political observers believe the gap between his slogans and the practical realities of his foreign policy remains deep.

The Timing of War: A Sensitive Variable in the Iran–Israel Equation

European diplomats, in conversations with Al-Monitor, have claimed that Israel will attack Iran in 2026, even if Donald Trump does not explicitly give the green light. According to these sources, the main concern is that Iran may once again pursue its nuclear program and further develop its missile capabilities. In this context, a Western diplomatic source said that a potential Israeli campaign against Iran would likely be short and intense, but ultimately would not yield a decisive achievement or create a real strategic outcome. The source emphasized that even if damage is inflicted, the strategic balance between the two sides would not change, and Iran would specifically retaliate with missile attacks, which, according to him, could once again target certain buildings, similar to the previous instance.

According to Al-Monitor, six months after the 12-day war, the US administration is now focused on advancing the second phase of Donald Trump’s Gaza peace plan, and any renewed Israeli attack on Iran could divert international attention from this agenda. From this perspective, the timing of any military action has become a decisive and sensitive variable in regional calculations.

Raz Zimmt, head of the “Iran and the Shiite Axis” research program at Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies, described the situation formed after the 12-day war as highly unstable and said that both sides are currently engaged in “conflict management,” but it is unclear how long this situation will last. He stressed that Israel’s main concerns can be explained through two scenarios: first, a miscalculation by one of the parties, which he considers less likely; and second, which he deems more probable, Iran’s return to uranium enrichment.

Return of Maximum Pressure: War in Suspension, Sanctions in Priority

American diplomatic sources have said that Donald Trump prefers, in the next step, to choose the path of “maximum escalation of sanctions” rather than move toward military confrontation with Iran; an approach intended to create stronger pressure and faster impact on Tehran. Based on this information, the US Treasury Department is preparing a package of sanctions against IRGC commanders. The goal of these sanctions is described as weakening the influence of IRGC commanders in decision-making processes, in order to push Tehran toward entering serious negotiations in the first quarter of 2026. These sources also emphasized that the war option, as the “final solution,” has been postponed until after congressional elections.

At the same time, political circles are discussing the possibility of Israeli military action with US support. In contrast, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Speaker of Iran’s Parliament, has dismissed the likelihood of a new war and said that the path of diplomacy remains open. On the other hand, the Trump administration has stated in its national security strategy document that the level of threat posed by Iran has decreased.

Taken together, these developments show that the Iran–US file is entering a highly fluid phase on the eve of 2026; a phase in which diplomacy has not been completely closed, but is moving under the shadow of maximum pressure, military threats, and deep mistrust. In this equation, any miscalculation could shift the path from negotiation to confrontation; a path whose costs would be decisive not only for Tehran and Washington, but for the entire region.