The Shiite marathon in Iraq — is history repeating itself?

At a time when Iraq is on the brink of holding its sixth parliamentary elections since 2003, the country’s political atmosphere has experienced one of its most turbulent periods over the past years.

According to Rokna, the special voting for security forces and internally displaced persons, usually an early sign of public sentiment, concluded on Sunday with an unprecedented 82 percent turnout, and early reports indicate a lead for Nouri al-Maliki, former prime minister and leader of the “State of Law” coalition. That lead, according to observers, could seriously influence the Shiite political alignment and the formation of the future government if confirmed. Opposing him, the current prime minister, Mohammed Shia’a al-Sudani, leader of the “Reconstruction and Development” coalition, stands in second place, raising the question of whether the incumbent Iraqi prime minister will be able to consolidate his position on the day of the nationwide vote or not.

However, it appears that at this juncture the significance of the November 11 election goes beyond a mere contest between political lists. The vote takes place as Iraq enters one of the most complex security and regional periods of the past two decades — from the 12-day confrontation between Iran and Israel this past summer to the pressure on Baghdad to simultaneously manage relations with Washington and Tehran. While to date the government has seemingly prevented the spill-over of regional crises into its territory, it remains unclear whether the future government will be able to maintain this fragile balance or not.

On the domestic front, Iraq’s challenges are more intertwined than ever. Voters’ priorities differ from one province to another; while public services such as electricity, water and other infrastructure are central in many regions, prioritized differently in the Kurdish areas and Basra. On the other hand, intra-Shiite competition among the various lists of the Coordination Framework has reduced the likelihood of Prime Minister al-Sudani’s continuation in office, and the electoral boycott by the Sadr movement has cast a heavy shadow on final participation. In the Kurdish front, deep divisions between the two main parties have further eroded the Kurdistan Region’s influence in Baghdad. All these factors have led analysts to propose different post-election scenarios: the possibility of a prolonged deadlock in the government formation process, a possible re-unification of the Shiite parties into a single coalition to counter the prime minister’s list, and the decisive role of Tehran’s and Washington’s stances in choosing the next prime minister.

Yet, another group of observers argue that Iraq’s political future will not only depend on the ballot box results, but will be shaped by three variables: the degree of involvement or silence of the religious authority, the extent and limits of Iran’s and America’s role-play, and the ability of Shiite, Kurdish and Sunni coalitions to reach a consensus capable of guaranteeing at least minimal stability. In their view, if these three axes are not aligned, Iraq could again fall into a cycle of multi-month stalemates; but in the optimistic scenario, this very election could be the starting point for re-defining the political order and restoring public trust.

On this occasion, with the aim of assessing the important and influential variables on Iraq’s parliamentary elections, we spoke with Alireza Majidi, an expert on Middle East affairs. Majidi said: The chance of Prime Minister al-Sudani depends on the number of his parliamentary seats, and the future prime minister must be selected with Shiite consensus, maintaining Iraq’s political and security frameworks, and substantial public participation. He also remarked that the role of the Sunni and Kurdish movements, and the Sadrists’ boycott, will affect the results and the political stability. The full text of the interview follows.

As a first question: Iraqi voters are influenced by sectarian and identity-based priorities, yet survey data show that variables such as access to electricity in some provinces, vehicles and job-creation projects may influence the votes of especially younger Iraqis. Given Prime Minister al-Sudani’s at least outward focus on infrastructure provision and launch of projects, how strong is his chance of staying in power? If Mr. al-Sudani secures more than 70 parliamentary seats, he will have a high chance of becoming prime minister; his odds are between 50 and 70 percent. If his seats pass 80, his premiership will be almost certain. But if his seats, even if he tops the list, are fewer than 60, his chance of becoming prime minister is low, and if below 50, his chances are practically near zero and almost excluded. Regarding his extension as prime minister, one cannot predict decisively. It is possible Mr. al-Sudani surpasses other lists and comes first, but the premiership in Iraq follows its own mechanisms and must have a parliamentary majority and be preferred by that majority; given these mechanisms my personal estimate for his chance of extension is under 50 percent, perhaps even 25 percent (for us, his continuation in these circumstances would be seriously undesirable).

Some point to the existing fissures within the Coordination Framework of Shiites — a structure that Mr. al-Sudani had depended on along with the chance of the Shiite consensus to assume power — and now we see the Iraqi political field transformed into a strength-contest among Shiite coalitions led by Nouri al‑Maliki, Qais Khazali and the coalition under al-Sudani. What is your evaluation of this matter: can the Iraqi premiership and his coalition traverse those gaps and hold the upper hand? According to the interpretative ruling issued by the Federal Supreme Court of Iraq in 2010, post-election coalitions may constitute the “largest bloc”. Under the Iraqi constitution, the prime minister’s appointment is not by the general parliament session but under this interpretive ruling that the “largest bloc” is not bound to the results of single electoral lists. In the current electoral law this point is emphasized: that list leaders must form the largest bloc. Knowing this framework, the Coordination Framework agreed that each group would enter the election with its own list and a real weighing would occur and after that decision-making about forming the largest bloc would take place and afterwards the prime minister would be selected. Thus the multiplicity of Shiite lists was an internal decision of the Coordination Framework. The number of Shiite lists in the election, which I must emphasize each has a minimum weight, is twelve lists, of which it is predicted that between eight lists and two lists on the border are within the Coordination Framework and possibly they will join. Eight to ten lists in the Coordination Framework will move, based on their results, toward forming the largest bloc. The key point is that the principal criterion of this framework is Shiite consensus. That means the future prime minister must arise from Shiite consensus and none should become prime minister who breaks that consensus and seeks votes outside the collective decisions and side-agreements. With such an equation the multiplicity of Shiite lists does not pose a problem, but given this framework if Mr. al-Sudani can secure more than 50 percent of the votes inside the Shiite camp, he will definitely become prime minister. Yet it seems that the election results probably will show that he will not be able to win more than 50 percent of Shiite seats.

A major absentee from the upcoming campaign is Moqtada al‑Sadr and the movement under his leadership. This Shiite leader has boycotted the elections; firstly how much can his absence, alongside statements such as corruption and lack of transparency which have mobilised the younger Iraqi voice, affect public participation? The Sadr movement will never return and is fully committed to boycotting the elections. Had they intended to support the elections, they should have acted by now and no such support has materialized. Therefore the Sadrists will boycott the elections and this matter will have a definite and tangible impact on public participation; it should not be underestimated. To elaborate further one should note that the turnout in Iraqi elections since 2014 has constantly dropped; in each cycle the number of voters has declined and the participation ratio has decreased. Naturally in this round also, given the Sadrist boycott, the decline will be more noticeable. In the prior election, the Sadrists had around 800 000 to 900 000 votes, and if this group does not participate in the current election, then considering approximately eight million voters, overall participation relative to the previous round will decline significantly.

In the Sunni bloc we also observe intensified competition among the parties; the Taqaddum Party led by Mohammed al‑Halbousi, the Azm Coalition led by Muthanna al‑Samarrai and the Siyadah Coalition under the leadership of Khamis al‑Khanzir. In your judgment which of these flows presently have the chance to assume the presidency of the Iraqi Parliament? In the Sunni milieu three main currents are competing for the largest votes: Taqaddum, led by al-Halbousi; Siyadah, led by al-Khanzir; and Azm, led by al-Samarrai. Which one will determine the presidency of the parliament depends on two factors: first, the number of votes each list secures; second, the role of other non-Sunni currents in selecting the president of the parliament. Meaning that the election of the parliament president depends on whether the Sunnis have an internal competition or whether the other currents like Shiites and Kurds also support a Sunni figure and follow their vote. In other words, will they participate themselves or merely acquiesce to a Sunni majority. It appears that Mr. al-Halbousi may hold the Sunni camp majority. The reason is the results of the last two elections: in the 2021 parliamentary election and the 2023 provincial council elections, al-Halbousi was significantly ahead of his rivals. He has two qualities: first, his attitude toward other Sunni leaders is proud and superior, seeing himself isolated and not sharing power with others — this causes other currents to dislike him. On the other hand, he has a clear track record: in 2021 he claimed to have rebuilt Anbar, and in the 2023 election he referred to these achievements. He also lamented that he was unjustly removed from the parliament presidency in 2021 and this fact influenced a portion of Sunnis. However, two years have passed and he has no deliverable track-record, and this could bring him into difficulty and encourage his two serious rivals, especially al-Khanzir and al-Samarrai, to hope for increasing their chance of securing the first Sunni list. Another important factor is the role of non-Sunni currents in selecting the parliament’s president. Precise response depends on the same mechanism used in selecting the prime minister: if non-Sunni currents move into prime minister selection it means that a Shiite list says we support this Sunni for the parliament presidency; in that case, al-Halbousi’s position among the Shiites and Kurds becomes shaky. That is, if the Shiites and Kurds are unwilling to back al-Halbousi and his Taqaddum party, his position weakens. Ultimately one cannot ignore that if al-Halbousi secures a substantially higher number of votes, the presidency of parliament will very likely go to him. The above question also applies to the Kurdistan Region especially after the 2024 election which paved the way for intensifying tensions between the Regional Government and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Some Iraqi observers claim that because of these divisions, the bargaining power of the Kurds in Baghdad has also been impacted. What is your assessment in this regard? According to the constitution and the regional law, after the parliamentary elections the local government in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq must be formed in accordance with the new parliament and begin work. So far, a new government has not yet been formed, and the main cause of this is the disagreement between the two classic patriarchal parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan regarding their electoral coordination. One of the major questions ahead of the election was whether these two parties would run a joint list or separate ones. A large part of the answer depends on their agreement on the government to be formed in Erbil. In practice, they did not run on a joint list for the Baghdad parliamentary elections and the likelihood of maintaining their unity in subsequent alignments is very low. The political tradition in the Kurdistan Region shows that the presidency is usually chosen from the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Even in the recent period, the current president, Abdul Latif Rashid, is from the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan but was supported by the Kurdistan Democratic Party. In the presidential election he was assisted by Barham Salih (also from the Patriotic Union). Ultimately in the competition — in which both main candidates were from the Patriotic Union — Rashid, backed by the Kurdistan Democratic Party, became president. This indicates that even when the Patriotic Union’s candidate does not win, the post usually still goes to a member of that party. Considering this pattern, it may be asserted with high probability that the next President of Iraq will also be a member of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and no major change will occur in this regard. The only plausible scenario for delay or change is a heavy defeat of one of the two parties in the parliamentary election. In prior cycles, these two parties held 21 seats in 2014, 18 in 2018 and 16 in 2021. In this cycle, Mr. Barham Salih, prior to the election, imprisoned key opponents in Sulaymaniyah. In Sulaymaniyah, the Kurdistan Democratic Party has no meaningful weight. His rival was the New Generation Movement, and he arrested its members and prevented their participation in campaign rallies. If this leads to a drop of Kurdistan Democratic Party votes from 16 seats to say 12, they may lose the presidency as well. But this scenario is very unlikely and change will not occur so easily. Finally, one must refer to the regional and extra-regional variables, especially the role of Iran and the United States in the upcoming electoral process; two actors that have influence in Iraq and whose results from the current campaign will be decisive for them. In your opinion, by what levers do Tehran and Washington influence votes? Among external variables, the United States has introduced its preferred prime minister as Mohammed Shia’a al-Sudani. For his victory, even appearances in the final days have been cast aside. Perhaps the U.S.’s ideal would be someone like Faeq al-Sheikh Ali as prime minister; secondly, maybe Adnan al-Zarfi might become prime minister. But Washington knows such a scenario is impossible, and within the current framework of Iraqi politics they are fully backing al-Sudani and advancing this trend. The U.S.’s objective is less dependent on the individual and more on the system; they aim to make Iraq systemically dependent and under their influence so that whoever becomes prime minister will ultimately be influenced by America. This does not deny the importance of the individual; in practice the United States is backing al-Sudani with full force and encouraging him even if he does not secure the Shiite camp’s majority, Washington will — through pressure on Turkey — intervene. Turkey is acting along this channel as well and through coordination with the Kurdistan Democratic Party seeks to support al-Sudani in forming the largest bloc. Regarding Iran, the primary priority for the process and frameworks, not merely the outcome, is central. The first point is that Iran stresses that the prime minister must be chosen from within the Shiite camp; in other words the process matters more than the person. The second point is the emphasis on preserving Iraq’s security and military frameworks. Iran regards this as a red line that no change should disrupt these frameworks. The third point is that Iraq must move towards greater independence and not be systemically dependent on any country. Finally, given the importance of the Shiite Coordination Framework as a whole, the future prime minister must be selected by Shiite consensus. Iran in this path has tools to influence; among them are the emphasis on maintaining the Shiite Framework’s cohesion and the commitment of all actors not to leave that framework to join with other forces for power-gain.

In your view, given the prevailing regional tensions and uncertainties (particularly the alleged U.S. warnings to Iraq’s Resistance Axis) how much can the results of Iraq’s parliamentary election move the country away from the sphere of confrontation or prepare the ground for involvement in tension? From this perspective the question has special importance; keep in mind that there is no doubt that the greater the participation in the elections, the higher the political stability and establishment. However, Iraq’s current condition is such that if political instability reaches security instability, the possibility of external actors entering the field becomes very high. But if a security instability does not occur, the concern of a direct attack on Iraq is not very serious. Although crises and conflicts in other regions might also draw Iraq in, a direct assault on the country is highly unlikely.