Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region: A Stage for a Major Power Struggle

Iraq is on the verge of holding its sixth parliamentary elections since 2003. Some observers describe the country’s public atmosphere as more filled with despair and distrust than ever before, predicting that voter turnout on November 11 may reach historic lows. Conversely, others believe that Iraqis are more hopeful than ever, expecting the next government to deliver a renewed phase of political stability and security through their participation at the polls.

According to Rokna, voters face a broad and complex array of options. A total of 7,768 candidates are competing for 329 parliamentary seats, organized into 31 coalitions and 38 parties, alongside roughly 75 independent candidates. This unusually high number of contestants reportedly caught election officials somewhat off guard. Moreover, the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) has disqualified more than 780 candidates in recent months due to various electoral violations, highlighting the administrative and regulatory challenges surrounding this election.

As reported by Amwaj Media, the candidates approved to participate in the elections largely belong to the three main blocs—Kurds, Shia Arabs, and Sunni Arabs—a division that mirrors the ethnic-sectarian quota system established after the fall of the Ba’ath Party in 2003 under U.S. supervision. Critics argue that this informal power-sharing mechanism is at the root of much of Iraq’s political crises, perpetuating cycles of complex, tense, and sometimes hostile elections that at times have threatened the cohesion of the political system.

Another contentious issue concerns the legal framework of the elections. The November 11 vote will be conducted under the amended electoral law passed in March 2023, which largely reversed the changes enacted in 2020 in response to the 2019 anti-establishment protests. In the fall of 2019, young Shia Iraqis took to the streets demanding the resignation of then-Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi and reforms to the electoral law to make competition easier for independent and emerging political forces. The 2020 electoral law adjustments aimed to address these demands, providing greater opportunities for independents and new political movements. The impact of these reforms was evident in the 2021 elections, as many Shia parties lost a portion of their votes, unable to adapt to the new electoral rules.

The Shia Camp

The main pillar of the ruling coalition, known as the State of Law Coalition, which includes Kurdish, Shia, and Sunni parties, is the Shia Coordination Framework—a central axis of Shia power in post-Saddam Iraq. Originally designed to consolidate Shia actors under one political umbrella, this framework fractured in June 2021 amid reports of the withdrawal of supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr. The split between Iran-aligned parties within the Coordination Framework and Sadr’s followers peaked in summer 2022, when Sadr-affiliated parliamentarians resigned and Sadr himself signaled a withdrawal from Iraqi politics. Analysts suggest that the Coordination Framework’s strategy is now to enter the upcoming elections separately, yet reunite post-election to form a government.

For the November 11 vote, Coordination Framework parties are running roughly 12 separate electoral lists. Observers argue that this aims to reduce vote fragmentation and maintain overall Shia influence. However, some experts contend that this multipolar approach reflects internal divisions and personal rivalries rather than a calculated strategy. Key figures in this bloc include Nouri al-Maliki of the State of Law Coalition, Hadi al-Amiri of the Badr Organization, Qais al-Khazali, Secretary-General of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, and Ammar al-Hakim, leader of the Hikma Movement—powerful actors who maintain distinct social bases and continue to shape Iraq’s political future.

Intense Competition Among Sunni Parties

The main competition among Sunni Arab leaders revolves around three actors: the Progress Party led by Mohammed al-Halbousi, the Determination Alliance led by Muthanna al-Samarrai, and the Sovereignty Alliance led by Khamis al-Khanjar. This rivalry focuses on controlling Sunni Arab representation, with the parliamentary speaker position as the ultimate prize, often requiring alliances with non-Sunni groups to gain leverage. The competition is largely transactional and personality-driven rather than ideological, making party loyalty fragile. Analysts note that Sunni politicians often lack a powerful external patron to mediate disputes or limit personal rivalries that undermine communal interests. While Turkey has historically acted as a significant external supporter, its influence has not consistently mitigated internal Sunni conflicts, potentially undermining collective Sunni interests post-election.

Power Crisis in the Kurdistan Region

Political developments in Iraqi Kurdistan are influenced by multiple factors, including the balance of power between the two main parties and their relations with Ankara, Baghdad, and Tehran. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in Erbil and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in Sulaymaniyah have yet to form a unified regional government more than a year after the October 2024 Kurdistan parliamentary elections, which were held after a two-year delay. Reports indicate that PUK leader Bafel Talabani insists that his party’s territorial control and military capacity justify “equal power balance” in cabinet formation and that the vice presidency should carry veto power.

Over the past two decades, KDP’s power has gradually increased relative to PUK, weakening previous power-sharing agreements between Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. The Iraqi presidency is generally drawn from the PUK, while the KDP retains the regional premiership. Upon assuming office in 2022, President Abdul Latif Rashid had KDP support despite his familial ties to PUK founder Jalal Talabani. The KDP’s expanded coalition with Turkey has led the PUK to cooperate more closely with Shia actors in Baghdad and Iran to maintain influence, reflecting a strategic pivot to safeguard its political relevance amid the KDP’s rising dominance.

Internal PUK disputes have further weakened its influence in Baghdad. In July 2021, Bafel Talabani dissolved the shared leadership structure after dismissing his cousin Lahur Sheikh Jangi Talabani, consolidating power. In August 2025, a surprise attack on PUK headquarters in Sulaymaniyah led to the arrest of Talabani’s cousin. Despite some reconciliation among Kurdish factions, KDP’s increased regional power and financial difficulties have reduced its leverage with the federal government. Tensions over oil resources remain, exemplified by Turkey’s March 2023 suspension of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, effectively halting independent Kurdish oil exports, reportedly in response to an arbitration ruling favoring Baghdad.

The New Sudani Coalition

Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, who assumed office in October 2022 with Coordination Framework backing, has recently demonstrated growing political independence from his initial supporters. He has formed a new electoral coalition, “Reconstruction and Development,” comprising seven political currents and figures, including Faleh al-Fayyadh, head of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), veteran secular politician Iyad Allawi, several independents, and tribal leaders. Analysts suggest this coalition is an effort by Sudani to consolidate personal authority and distance himself from Shia-aligned parties, while others see it as a pragmatic approach emphasizing basic services, balanced relations with Tehran and Washington, and projecting himself as a nationalist leader capable of delivering stability and development.

The Reconstruction and Development campaign, true to its name, emphasizes the slogan: “Iraq First.” Sudani frames this as a long-overdue commitment to the Iraqi people after decades of upheaval, from the turbulent monarchy to the Iran-Iraq wars, the U.S. invasion, and subsequent deadly sectarian conflicts. Experts predict the coalition could secure 50–60 parliamentary seats, forming a potential base for competing for the premiership.

The Major Absentee of the 2025 Elections

The Sadr movement is notably absent. Having exited formal politics, it is boycotting the elections and urging followers to do the same. Muqtada al-Sadr, a powerful Shia cleric, effectively transforms individual non-participation into a collective stance, maintaining strong mobilization power in central and southern Iraq. Unlike previous elections, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani has yet to issue a public call for participation, effectively leaving Sadr’s boycott unchallenged and undermining the moral equilibrium of political competition. Analysts warn that if Sadr insists on the boycott and Najaf remains silent, hesitant voters—particularly Shia—may abstain, potentially reducing the legitimacy of the next parliament and government and eroding public trust in their capacity to deliver stability and welfare amid heightened fiscal pressure. Sadr and his movement remain unpredictable and may intervene at the last moment to influence outcomes, generally benefiting liberal and prime ministerial-aligned lists while preventing the Coordination Framework from securing sufficient post-election leverage.

From Ballot Box to Premiership

The Iraqi Constitution provides a general timeline for government formation post-election, but in practice, each stage serves as a bargaining arena for political factions to exchange positions and consolidate elite agreements sustaining the system. According to the Atlantic Council, the average duration from election to government formation since 2005 has been approximately 224 days. Cabinet posts are allocated based on an informal “point system” proportional to parliamentary seat counts, with government formation negotiations commencing immediately after results approval and any vote disputes resolved by the Federal Supreme Court.

Within 15 days of result approval, the interim president must summon the newly elected parliament. The first parliamentary session, presided over by the oldest member, elects the Speaker and two deputies by absolute majority, often becoming the first negotiation arena, with sessions delayed for months, as in 2022. Following the Speaker’s election, the president requires a two-thirds parliamentary majority, triggering intense political bargaining. Since 2022, this supermajority requirement enables minority obstruction. The president then has 15 days to nominate the prime minister from the largest post-election coalition—a source of disputes, with the 2010 Supreme Court ruling interpreting the largest coalition as post-election formation rather than the party with the most seats, allowing Maliki’s coalition to supersede Allawi’s winning alliance. The nominated prime minister then has 30 days to present the cabinet and program for parliamentary confidence, with ministries allocated among major blocs proportional to their parliamentary weight.

External Influence in Baghdad’s Elections

As with all Iraqi parliamentary elections since 2005, the outcome is crucial for external actors like Iran and the United States. Tehran’s interest has intensified due to regional developments affecting Iraq, while Washington appointed Mark Savage as special envoy to Iraq last month, expected to focus post-election on curbing Iranian influence and limiting PMF authority. Even if the Coordination Framework maintains power, its leaders may need to make significant concessions to satisfy Washington and sideline some factions in the new political equation.

Iraq’s Political Future: Three Scenarios

Three scenarios are conceivable regarding the election outcome:

1. Status Quo Continuation: With stabilized regional conditions, Sudani retains the premiership as an unexpected factor.

2. New Balance Among Factions: A fresh equilibrium emerges among Iraq’s diverse groups, initiating reform processes. The PMF may be constrained, and a broader political settlement reached, though ethnic-sectarian quotas and political networks remain intact. Sudani could form a new tripartite coalition, marginalizing some Iran-aligned factions.

3. Low Turnout and Crisis: Reduced participation could trigger a political and security crisis akin to post-2021 elections. Militias might challenge power on the streets. If Sudani’s coalition fails to secure sufficient seats, dominant Coordination Framework parties could sideline him from a second term. Failure to assemble a governing coalition with Kurdish and Sunni Arab winners may compel the prime minister to return to the Coordination Framework to legitimize his candidacy.