What Is the Structure of the Defense Council, and Who Will Chair It?

Two recent developments from the supreme national security council draw wide reactions the publication of two pieces of news from within the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) in recent days has drawn considerable attention. First, the strong possibility of Ali Larijani assuming the position of Secretary of the SNSC—given that the news was published by Fars News Agency, it can be inferred that the matter is under formal governmental consideration, and one can now more assertively await the official announcement. Second, the formation of a Defense Council within the SNSC.

The Iranian Constitution explicitly allows the SNSC to establish sub-councils when necessary. The formation of a Defense Council in the current circumstances of the country reflects a broader strategic outlook regarding both near-term and long-term contingencies.

According to Article 176 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (ratified in 1989), the SNSC has clear responsibilities and powers related to safeguarding national interests, protecting the Islamic Revolution, territorial integrity, and national sovereignty. As per this article, the responsibilities of the Council—chaired by the President—are defined as follows:

1. Determining the defense and national security policies within the framework of general policies set by the Supreme Leader.

2. Coordinating political, intelligence, social, cultural, and economic activities in line with overall defense and security strategies.

3. Utilizing the material and spiritual resources of the country to confront internal and external threats.

In addition, Clause 7 of Article 110 of the Constitution allows the Supreme Leader to form high councils or dispute resolution bodies for regulating the relationship among the three branches of government. It appears the decision to form a Defense Council under the SNSC is based on this constitutional clause, although the council has not yet been formally activated.

Nevertheless, many have compared this new Defense Council to the Supreme Defense Council formed during the eight-year Iran-Iraq War, even calling it a "revival" of that body. However, these two councils differ significantly—just as the current defense conditions differ from those of the Iran-Iraq War era, and the country’s military and security structures have evolved over the nearly four decades since then.

The most fundamental difference between the two councils lies in their organizational structure. The current Defense Council, whose establishment has been announced even before its operationalization, is a sub-entity of the SNSC. By contrast, the "Supreme Defense Council," which during the Iran-Iraq War functioned as a de facto war command center, was essentially the predecessor to the SNSC. In other words, the Supreme Defense Council was transformed into the SNSC after the war in response to the requirements of the time.

This transformation was not merely nominal. The strategic significance of the SNSC—which is now set to house a Defense Council—is incomparable to that of the former Supreme Defense Council.

To illustrate the role of the Supreme Defense Council in critical wartime decisions, it suffices to point out that during the final year of the Iran-Iraq War, the Council was not actively engaged in deliberations on UN Security Council Resolution 598. Historical documents indicate that none of its resolutions were influential in key moments of decision-making. At one point, the Council even rejected the resolution on the grounds of opposition. Nevertheless, not long afterward, the resolution was accepted by Iran. Such examples demonstrate that the Supreme Defense Council never possessed the influence now vested in the SNSC.

Additionally, in a recent report reviewing the activities and legacy of the Supreme Defense Council, one of the Council’s major contributions during the war was supervising and guiding operational military plans. About three months into the war, the plan to break the siege of Abadan was proposed and approved during a session of the Council, though it was not implemented until after President Bani-Sadr’s dismissal. That same plan was later carried out by the 77th Khorasan Division and successfully broke the siege of Abadan on October 5, 1981.

Although the detailed records of the Supreme Defense Council’s meetings remain classified even after four decades, and no access to its internal deliberations exists, it is clear that the level of influence wielded by the current SNSC in today's critical national matters—military or otherwise—is far greater than that of the Supreme Defense Council during the 1980s. Most of today’s vital national decisions must pass through the SNSC, whereas historical records and wartime commanders’ memoirs do not assign such a central role to the Supreme Defense Council.

Therefore, the establishment of the new Defense Council under the SNSC is likely aimed at shaping a decision-making body with a different level of influence than the earlier Supreme Defense Council. It is essential to emphasize that this distinction in institutional significance does not diminish the roles or contributions of the individuals who served in the Supreme Defense Council, as their authority stemmed from other high-ranking positions in the governance structure—not merely from their membership in the Council.

What Was the Structure of the Supreme Defense Council and How Was It Managed?

The Supreme Defense Council during the Iran-Iraq War consisted of seven members:

1. The President

2. The Prime Minister

3. The Minister of Defense

4. The Chief of the Joint Staff

5. The Commander-in-Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)

6. Two advisors appointed by the Supreme Leader

The Council was formed in 1980 before the war began but assumed its operational identity once the war started. Before the constitutional amendments of 1989, its chairmanship belonged to the President, while the Commander-in-Chief had two representatives in the Council. The first representatives of Imam Khomeini in the Council were Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei—who had previously served as Deputy Defense Minister and Commander of the IRGC—and Mostafa Chamran, the Defense Minister in the interim government. Upon Ayatollah Khamenei’s election as President, he assumed the Council’s presidency, and Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani was appointed as Imam Khomeini’s representative. At one point, Rafsanjani also acted as the Council’s spokesperson.

In the draft version of the Constitution, the President was designated as the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Though the Assembly of Experts ultimately transferred portions of this authority to the Supreme Leader, the chairmanship of the Supreme Defense Council remained with the President.

The key figures of the Council during the war were largely known for their other prominent roles. For example, Ayatollah Khamenei was publicly recognized as both President and Commander-in-Chief, while Rafsanjani played significant wartime roles due to his position as Parliament Speaker. Unlike today—when the Defense Council is conceived as a military-security think tank chaired by the President within the SNSC—those historical figures derived their influence from broader political authority, not simply from their membership in the Council.

In an oral history interview, Rafsanjani recounted:
"Imam (Khomeini) formed a council composed of relevant officials and military commanders. I later became its spokesperson, though at that time I had no executive responsibility in the war. During that period, Bani-Sadr was the acting Commander-in-Chief and provided us with filtered information. Before Operation Kheibar, Imam appointed me as war commander. At that time, while I was in the Council, I was not the top figure in the war. Perhaps Bani-Sadr was. He was both President and Commander-in-Chief. But when Imam designated me as war commander, I became the leading figure—at least formally—from the third year of the war onward."

What Is the Structure of the New Defense Council and Who Will Chair It?

The Chair of the Defense Council, like any other subsidiary body, must be a member of the SNSC. An individual outside the SNSC—such as the top commanders of the Army or the IRGC—cannot be appointed to this role. Although these top military figures may attend SNSC sessions by convention, their participation is conditional and defined as follows: "As needed, the relevant minister and the highest-ranking Army and IRGC commanders."

It was mentioned in the previous report "the members of the new Defense Council will include the heads of the three branches of government, two representatives of the Supreme Leader in the SNSC, the Minister of Intelligence, the Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, the Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC, and the Commander of Khatam al-Anbia Central Headquarters."

The same report indicates that the President will chair the Defense Council, and a senior military commander will likely be appointed as its Secretary. The new Council has been formed under the framework of Article 176 of the Constitution, which authorizes the SNSC to form "subsidiary councils such as the Defense Council and National Security Council" as needed. This article further stipulates: "The chair of each sub-council shall be the President or another SNSC member designated by the President. The scope of authority and duties of the sub-councils shall be determined by law, and their structures must be approved by the Supreme National Security Council."

Various conservative factions have reacted differently to the news. Khorasan Newspaper, known for its proximity to Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, reported—based on insider information—that along with the Defense Council, the reactivation of the Supreme Intelligence Council and the National Security Council is also under consideration. Within this framework, names like Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i for the Supreme Intelligence Council and Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf for the Defense Council have been proposed. The prospective composition of the Defense Council includes the heads of the three branches of government, the Minister of Intelligence, two Supreme Leader representatives, the Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff, and the top IRGC and Army commanders as well as the Commander of Khatam al-Anbia Headquarters. Furthermore, it is reported that Ali Larijani will likely replace Ali Akbar Ahmadian as the SNSC Secretary.

The establishment of this Council has faced criticism. Hamid Rasaei, a member of Parliament, raised an objection during a recent parliamentary session, arguing that the Council’s formation would marginalize the legislature. He said, “At this rate, Parliament will be rendered irrelevant.” In response, Ali Nikzad, a member of the parliamentary presidium, clarified that the Council will not become operational until it has received the Supreme Leader’s approval.

Ali Bigdeli, senior foreign policy analyst and university professor, commented on the Defense Council’s formation and the opposition from hardline MPs: “There is nothing strange or new about the formation of the Defense Council. It existed during the war as well. The protests from these individuals are odd. The key question to them is: When a country faces the threat of violated ceasefires and looming war, why would extraneous institutions become heavily involved in warfare decisions? In all countries, such situations demand the suspension of non-essential functions and a focus on the crisis. In our country, all such decisions are made under the supervision of the Supreme Leader, and Parliament plays no significant role in these national decisions. There is no abnormality or error in what is happening.”

The formation of the Defense Council can be seen as a clear sign of the redefinition of threats and a reconfiguration of power structures in the Islamic Republic. Though seemingly a technical policy body for defense affairs, it effectively marks a paradigmatic shift in crisis management, rapid decision-making, and distribution of responsibility among the levels of power. According to current reports, the Defense Council will begin operations under the chairmanship of Masoud Pezeshkian and the secretariat of Ali Larijani, under the umbrella of the SNSC. Clearly, its establishment aims at consolidating the decision-making apparatus under the Supreme Commander-in-Chief in anticipation of possible future conflicts.

While it is expected that some members of Parliament and other institutions may resist this concentration of decision-making power, fearing a reduction in their legal authorities, wartime conditions demand institutional evolution and the flexible formation of command centers wherever necessary.