Araghchi’s Letter to the UN on Misinterpretation of “Snapback” by European Troika

According to Rokna, the text of Seyyed Abbas Araghchi’s letter is as follows:

"I hereby address certain false claims contained in the letter dated 8 August 2025 from the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (hereinafter referred to as the Troika) regarding the situation related to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015). The aforementioned letter, by distorting facts, constitutes another attempt to pave the way for two improper courses of action, both of which are unjust and represent a dangerous precedent in undermining the credibility and unity of the Security Council and its resolutions.

Distortion of Facts by the Troika

It should be reiterated that such behavior cannot in any way be justified by reference to the fully legitimate and lawful remedial measures undertaken by the Islamic Republic of Iran, implemented gradually and proportionately, in full conformity with the procedures and rights provided under the JCPOA. Nevertheless, the Troika’s letter, in an ironically inadvertent manner, exposes two fundamental flaws in the Troika’s reasoning for any potential recourse to what is so-called the “snapback” mechanism:

A) The sequence of events is critical. The Troika, by falsely claiming that “Iran only activated the dispute resolution mechanism in July 2020,” seeks to invalidate Iran’s remedial measures, distort the chronology of events, and simultaneously obscure the fact that the Islamic Republic of Iran had officially activated the dispute resolution mechanism in its letter dated 10 May 2018. This declaration led to the convening of Joint Commission meetings and other actions foreseen to fully exhaust the mechanism. Iran, once again, on 21 August 2018, emphasized its recourse to Article 36, stating that it had previously “resorted to the dispute resolution mechanism under Article 36 of the JCPOA, which led to the convening of the Joint Commission at the political directors’ and foreign ministers’ levels on 25 May and 6 July 2018, respectively.”

By raising the issue of sequence, the Troika implicitly acknowledges that the order of activation of the dispute resolution mechanism by different parties is significant; actions taken under Article 36 of the JCPOA cannot serve as a basis to justify countermeasures by other parties. In short, the Troika’s own argument acknowledges that remedial measures cannot be invoked against prior remedial measures of the other party, and such reasoning is unacceptable and inapplicable.

B) False claim regarding recognition of the activation of the dispute resolution mechanism. The Troika falsely asserts that “any subsequent recourse to this mechanism has neither at the time nor today been recognized by the JCPOA members,” suggesting that the validity of activating the dispute resolution mechanism requires consensus among JCPOA members. By the same logic, the Troika’s own attempt to activate the mechanism or trigger the snapback sanctions lacks validity, as it was never explicitly recognized by other JCPOA members.

If only one activation of the dispute resolution mechanism is to be considered valid, recognized, and fully exhausted, it is the one initiated by the Islamic Republic of Iran on 10 May 2018. This action led to the extraordinary meeting of the Joint Commission on 25 May 2018 and the ministerial meeting on 6 July 2018, both convened at Iran’s request. Following these meetings, the Islamic Republic of Iran, in multiple communications including letters dated 21 August and 6 November 2018, as well as 7 April 2019, explicitly stated that it had resorted to Article 36 of the JCPOA and would gradually suspend its obligations under the JCPOA according to the established timeline should other parties continue to fail to fulfill their commitments.

The Troika’s letter, in effect, undermines its own credibility. Their attempt to activate the dispute resolution mechanism, which coincided with continued inaction on their part, constitutes a “remedial action against a remedial action” that was neither recognized by all JCPOA members nor fully exhausted.

As detailed in the letter dated 29 January 2020 from the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran to the JCPOA Coordinator (attached hereto), Iran had effectively and formally activated the dispute resolution mechanism well before initiating its remedial measures, and it was only fully exhausted once it became clear that issues arising from the US withdrawal from the JCPOA and the imposition of sanctions on Iran by other members were irremediable.

It should be emphasized that the Troika’s reference to the JCPOA dispute resolution mechanism, citing their 14 January 2020 letter in response to Iran’s remedial measures from May 2019 onward, is entirely misleading and irrelevant. As repeatedly stated in correspondence, Iran’s decision to suspend its obligations was a lawful and legitimate response under Articles 26 and 36 of the JCPOA to the unilateral US withdrawal and the re-imposition of illegal sanctions. Therefore, it is entirely illogical for the Troika to consider their own non-compliance or efforts to trigger snapback sanctions as a reaction to Iran’s fully legitimate remedial measures, which occurred a full year after the illegal US withdrawal and the Troika’s failure to fulfill its obligations.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has explicitly and formally notified the JCPOA Joint Commission Coordinator, and through him the other members, that it has invoked Article 36 and the dispute resolution mechanism provided therein. In particular, in the letter dated 29 January 2020, Iran confirmed that all avenues envisaged under Article 36 were fully exhausted. The Joint Commission ministerial meeting on 6 July 2018 also recognized the issues Iran referred to as “unresolved” and subsequently approved a set of obligations regarding these issues. These issues remain unresolved to this day, and no outcome satisfying Iran as the aggrieved party has been achieved. These unresolved matters cannot serve as a basis for the Troika’s decision to activate the snapback mechanism.

It is worth noting that these facts in no way affect the exclusive rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran under Article 26 of the JCPOA, which explicitly states that Iran “shall regard the re-imposition or re-activation of sanctions (...) as a reason to suspend its implementation of JCPOA obligations, in whole or in part.”

Unlike the Troika’s malicious behavior, the actions of the Islamic Republic of Iran, fully in accordance with its rights under Articles 26 and 36, were aimed at safeguarding the agreement by ensuring compliance, not undermining it. Iran provided sufficient notification, participated in Joint Commission meetings in good faith, calibrated its measures to be reversible, and maintained diplomatic engagement to restore full JCPOA implementation. The Troika’s depiction of these legitimate actions as “non-compliance” neglects their own responsibility in prompting this legitimate recourse.

Resolution 2231 Must Expire on Schedule

In line with its policy of leveraging the snapback mechanism as a tool to extract concessions, the Troika has “proposed” a limited extension of the relevant provisions of UNSC Resolution 2231 conditioned upon Iran meeting certain demands. Nevertheless, the Islamic Republic of Iran firmly believes that Resolution 2231 must expire according to its prescribed timeline.

Any other attempt contrary to the facts and ignoring the ultimate purpose of the resolution establishes a flawed precedent in Security Council operations and deepens divisions within the Council. In such an adverse scenario, the Islamic Republic of Iran will respond decisively and proportionately, taking into account its national interests.

Iran calls upon the Security Council to fully adhere to the binding timelines stipulated in Resolution 2231, allowing its provisions to conclude as foreseen, thereby paving the way for the resumption of diplomatic engagement in a more constructive environment, free from coercion and threat.

Iran Remains Open to Diplomacy

The Islamic Republic of Iran firmly believes that diplomacy remains the most effective and efficient avenue for resolving disputes. As emphasized during the meeting of Iranian Deputy Foreign Ministers with EU political directors and the Troika on 25 July in Istanbul, Iran underscores its commitment to meaningful diplomatic engagement with the goal of achieving a new agreement—one that respects Iran’s rights under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and addresses all mutual concerns, including the unjust sanctions that target the livelihood and welfare of the Iranian people.

Iran calls on all members of the Security Council to reject unfair political maneuvers and to uphold the integrity of international law and the authority of the Security Council. The path forward lies in mutual respect, not coercion.

It would be appreciated if the present correspondence is instructed to be registered and distributed as a document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

Respectfully,
[Seyyed Abbas Araghchi]